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PREFACE
When I arrived to Washington DC in May 2009 to begin my internship at the office 
of the Austrian Trade Commission, my mind was firmly set on a thesis project on 
Haiti.  The  intensive  study  of  International  Development  during  my  previous 
exchange  semester  at  the  Hubert  Humphrey  Institute  of  Public  Affairs  at  the 
University  of  Minnesota  had  further  deepened  my  interest  for  developmental 
issues and,  combined with  my interest  and experiences in  the region  of  Latin 
America, had inspired me to write about this exceptionally poor and disaster-struck 
country in the Western hemisphere.
It was not until August 2009, however, and many conversations with Austrian and 
other officials of various ministries and International Financial Institutions later that 
I decided to change the theme of my thesis to a more practical one, which I was 
personally closer to. In July 2009, I started my internship at the Opportunities for 
the Majority (OMJ) office at the Inter-American Development Bank where I was 
confronted  with  a  new  approach  to  development,  leaving  my  fascinated  and 
skeptical at the same time. Based on the Bottom-of-the-pyramid model developed 
by C.K.Prahalad, the OMJ office supports market-based solutions for the poor in 
the region of Latin America and the Caribbean. Curious to learn more about this 
new approach, I started reading and researching and eventually, decided to write 
my thesis  about  the Bottom-of-the-Pyramid approach and OMJ.  Motivated and 
supported by my fellow colleagues in the OMJ office as well as Elisabeth Gruber, 
the Austrian Alternate Executive Director to the IADB, who immediately offered to 
function as my advisor of thesis, I pursued this idea and was able to complete a 
substantial part of the document until my departure from Washington DC by the 
end of 2009.  The time in Washington DC, and at OMJ in particular,  was very 
valuable for me and I appreciate having had the opportunity to work with such a 
young and dedicated team. Only after my transition back to Europe and several 
events at the Graduate Institute of International Studies and Development at the 
University  of  Geneva  (where  I  am  currently  completing  my  last  semester  of 
studies) later did I fully realize how much I had learnt about development policy 
and social business. Much of this knowledge has been acquired and reproduced 
during the elaboration of this thesis.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The alleviation of global poverty remains one of the major challenges of our time. 
Heading the United Nations’ ambitious Millennium Development Goals for the year 
2015, it is also the mission of a multitude of organizations, global and local. However, 
despite many years of efforts and development interventions, mostly driven by the 
public sector, global poverty still persists. With the need for alternative and innovative 
strategies for  poverty  reduction and the increasingly  important  role  of  the private 
sector  in  our  ever  more  globalized  society,  new  private-sector  led  models  of 
development  have  been  developed.  A  prominent  example  is  the  Bottom-of-the-
Pryamid  model  championed  by  C.K.  Prahalad  and  Stuart  Hart  which  intends  to 
achieve the alleviation of poverty by creating a win-win scenario for companies and 
the poor.  In directing profitable  business activities at  low-income populations and 
incorporating  them  into  the  formal  economy,  the  theory  predicts  gains  for  the 
company as well as for the poor who will benefit from enhanced capabilities, a higher 
standard of living and eventually, the overcoming of poverty. Despite much criticism 
for  dubious assumptions  and the  potential  risk  of  exploiting  the  poor,  Prahalad’s 
model has enjoyed high acceptance among international development institutions. 
The  Inter-American  Development  Bank  has  demonstrated  particular  interest  and 
founded  the  Opportunities  for  the  Majority  Initiative  dedicated  exclusively  to  the 
support of BoP business solutions. By taking a closer look at the activities of this 
office  and  assessing  them  systematically,  the  aim  of  this  thesis  is  to  make  a 
statement about the feasibility and effectiveness of the BoP approach. 
On a more general level, the work is intended to contribute to the overall discourse 
on the role of the private sector in development.
1.1 Notes about language and terminology
Despite being a native speaker of German, I am writing this thesis in English. I am 
not doing it because I value one language more than the other, nor did I consider the 
predominance of English as the global “lingua franca” in academics and everyday 
life. Rather I  recurred to English as working language for this project for practical 
reasons. Given that I began my research and readings in Washington DC, I was not 
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only  constantly  exposed  to  an  English-speaking  environment  but  also  worked 
predominantly with literature in English language. 
English also offers an advantage over German regarding the use of gender neutral 
language.  The  use  of  such  terminology  is  important  to  me  and  it  seems  to  be 
implemented more naturally in English as the singular and plural of most words are 
gender neutral and address both females and males alike. 
Moreover, writing my thesis in English, gives me the opportunity to make it available 
to  many  international  friends  and  colleagues  whose  support  was  critical  in  its 
development but who are not able to speak and read German. 
At this point, it seems also important to explain the terminology I used to group, name 
and define the countries of this world. Traditionally, the categories “developed” or 
“industrialized”  countries  as  opposed  to  “developing”  countries  have  been  most 
widely used in scientific literature as well as official documents. 
However,  since  such terminology usually  implies  a  definition  of  “development”  in 
exclusively  economic  terms,  it  seems  outdated,  given  the  broader  definition  of 
“development”  including  social  and  institutional  indicators  which  has  meanwhile 
become the mainstream in recent development studies. In this thesis, I will therefore 
adopt a different terminology. I will call the USA, the EU member states, Switzerland, 
Norway, Canada, Japan, Australia and New Zealand countries of the “Global North” 
and  all  the  others  countries  of  the  “Global  South”.  These  two  categories  have 
become  widespread  in  recent  development  literature  (see  for  example  Goldman 
2005) as they emphasize the geographic division that correlates to some extent with 
the preponderance of poverty. Furthermore, this categorization of countries reflects 
the groups of  “donor”  and “recipient”  countries within the context  of  development 
cooperation under the OECD-DAC. Nonetheless, it is important to remark that neither 
group of countries is homogeneous. Just as the USA or the EU might differ in their 
priorities  and  weight  in  developmental  issues  compared  to  smaller,  yet  wealthy 
countries, such as New Zealand, the group of countries in the Global South includes 
emerging powers, such as China, India and Brazil as well as small and impoverished 
nations  in  Africa  and  Asia.  For  the  purpose of  this  thesis,  however,  the  general 
division between the Global North and South should suffice. 
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1.2 Structure
The present thesis consists of five chapters: an introductory, two theoretical and two 
which are more practical in content.
The first chapter intends to give an introduction into the subject and lays down the 
main concepts and assumptions which provide the basis for the following analysis. 
Chapter  two  discusses  the  issue  of  poverty.  Following  an  overview  of  different 
definitions of the phenomenon, the theoretical concepts of state versus market failure 
will  be  addressed.  Subsequently,  I  will  review  different  strategies  of  poverty 
reduction, ranging from traditional aid-based approaches to newer models of private-
sector led development. 
The third chapter of the thesis then elaborates on the “Bottom of the Pyramid” model 
according to C.K. Prahalad, its origins, theoretical concept and points of critique. Two 
case  studies  will  be  included  to  better  illustrate  this  relatively  new  approach  to 
poverty reduction.
The practical and empirical part of this thesis will follow in chapter four. This chapter 
will  provide  an  overview  of  the  history  and  structure  of  the  Inter-American 
Development  Bank  as  well  as  its  operations  in  the  field  of  private  sector 
development. Special attention will be paid to the activities of the Opportunities for 
the Majority Initiative, which supports the implementation of BoP business according 
to C.K. Prahalad’s model.  Based on two case studies, I  will  try to evaluate if  the 
points of critique raised at the theory of the model are justified also for the practice as 
executed by OMJ. 
The  final  chapter  of  this  work  (chapter  five)  will  eventually  summarize  the  main 
findings and complete this work with an outlook for the future.
1.3 Research Issue, Questions and Hypotheses
As already evident from the title of this thesis, the main research issue concerns the 
critical  assessment  of  the  “Bottom  of  the  Pyramid”  approach  according  to  C.K. 
Prahalad as a new private sector led development strategy. I intend to analyze it on 
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two  levels:  a)  as  a  theoretical  concept  and  b)  in  its  implementation  by  the 
Opportunities for the Majority office of the Inter-American Development Bank. 
Derived from this research issue, I formulated the following research questions and 
hypothesis, which I will try to verify or falsify in the present thesis:
• What is new in the “Bottom of the Pyramid” approach to poverty alleviation 
according to C.K. Prahalad in comparison with traditional public and private 
sector strategies for poverty reduction? 
 The BoP approach represents a novel strategy for poverty reduction and can 
be  clearly  differentiated  from  traditional  public  or  private  sector  led 
approaches.
• What  are  the  major  points  of  conceptual  critique  at  C.K.  Prahalad’s  BoP 
model?
 C.K.  Prahalad’s  BoP  model  can  be  criticized  for  a  number  of  theoretical 
weaknesses, such as a too narrow definition of poverty and development, an 
over-estimation  of  the  BoP  market  size,  insufficient  targeting  of  Least 
Developed Countries, the inadequacy of MNCs as actors in development and 
the  detraction  from  the  imperative  to  correct  government  failures  which 
altogether may eventually lead to exploitation of the poor.
• How is  the  BoP Model  implemented  by  the  Opportunities  for  the  Majority 
(OMJ) office of the Inter-American Development Bank? 
 The OMJ office of the IADB supports projects which fit C.K. Prahalad’s BoP 
business concept; yet not all of its projects fully comply with Prahalad’s theory. 
• Do the conceptional points of critique at C.K. Prahalad’s BoP Model apply to 
the BoP projects of the OMJ office? 
 The  points  of  critique  raised  at  the  theoretical  concept  of  Prahalad’s  BoP 
model also apply to its implementation through OMJ projects, except in cases 
where a deviation from Prahalad’s model has been adopted.
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1.4 Research Methods
The most important research method I used for the development of this thesis was 
the review of scientific primary and secondary literature, online resources as well as 
original documents of international development organizations, notably the IADB.  My 
research process was complemented by an expert interview with Dana Martin, the 
principal private sector specialist of the IADB’s Opportunities for the Majority office, 
who proved to be an additional valuable source of information.
Although  my  attempt  is  to  draw  general  conclusions  about  the  theory  by  C.K. 
Prahalad and the activities of OMJ, a complete assessment of all projects would go 
far beyond the scope of this thesis. In addition, empirical evidence on BoP projects is 
still scarce and further limits the possibilities for analysis. Due to these restrictions, 
my  analysis  will  be  primarily  conceptual  with  heuristic  intent.  I  will  limit  my 
assessment  to  a  small  number  of  carefully  selected  case  studies  and  draw 
conclusions from them. I  am aware that  a few project  examples cannot  serve to 
validate or discredit an entire development model (as their outcome can depend on 
many factors); however, they can be useful to illustrate strengths and weaknesses of 
a model or expose potential inherent contradictions (see McFalls 2007, 89). Although 
some scholars despise this method for its lack of scientific rigor (see Karnani 2007), 
others value it especially in cases where not enough previous research is available 
and no precise outcome is predicted (see McFalls 2007, 89).
2. POVERTY REDUCTION STRATEGIES
2.1 Definitions of Poverty
”What is poverty? Poverty is hunger. Poverty is lack of shelter. Poverty is being sick  
and not being able to see a doctor. Poverty is not having access to school and not  
knowing how to read. Poverty is not having a job, is fear for the future, living one day  
at a time. Poverty is losing a child to illness brought about by unclean water. Poverty  
is powerlessness, lack of representation and freedom. Poverty has many faces (…)”  
(World Bank 2010, www) 
Defining  poverty  is  not  as  straightforward  as  it  may  seem.  Academics  and 
practitioners throughout the world have developed countless definitions, unable to 
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establish universal defining criteria for this phenomenon. Nevertheless, framing the 
issue of poverty is essential because “how one defines or describes it has significant  
consequences  for  any  potential  solution”  (Werhane  et  al.  2009,  10).  Definitions, 
descriptions and measures of poverty always imply a normative component, i.e. “the 
way  in  which  one  describes  the  problem and frames the  data  shapes how one  
envisions the solution and allocates resources.” (ibid, 11) Therefore, it makes a big 
difference  if  subjective  poverty  measures  are  used  based  on  survey  data  from 
specific target groups or if poverty is measured by criteria which can be more easily 
compared internationally, such as per capita income. Furthermore, it is important to 
distinguish between the concepts of absolute and relative poverty. While absolute 
poverty  refers  to  the  living  condition  below  a  certain  fixed  poverty  line  (most 
commonly used with monetary measures of poverty), relative poverty lines reflect a 
percentage  of  the  (national)  average  income  or  consumption  (see  World  Bank 
Institute 2005, 43).
In the following chapter I will present three of the most prevalent definitions of poverty 
and  methods  of  measurement  in  international  economics  and  development: 
monetary  measures  of  poverty,  biometric  measures  and measures  based on the 
deprivation-of-capabilities approach. Each of these approaches having its merits and 
deficiencies,  it  is  suggested that  “poverty lines are as much political  as scientific  
constructions.” (Deaton 2004, 7)
2.1.1 Monetary measures of poverty  
In  the  beginning  of  development  thinking  after  World  War  II,  development  was 
essentially  understood as economic growth and measured in  terms of  GDP (see 
Raffer/Singer 2001, 32). This definition consequently led to a definition of poverty 
from a macro-economic perspective in terms of inferior levels of GDP and GDP per 
capita.  However,  with  increasing  academic  activity  in  the  subject,  scholars  also 
sought for a definition of poverty from a micro-economic perspective. Probably the 
most widespread of these was developed by economists of the World Bank in 1990. 
In its flagship publication The World Development Report, the institution first adopted 
the  poverty  line  of  a  consumption/income  of  US$  1  per  person  per  day  as  its 
measure for absolute poverty (see The Economist 2008, www). The World Bank’s 
economists arbitrarily determined this specific cut-off point based on the comparison 
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of several national poverty lines of developing countries which all clustered around 
this amount (see ibid). The implicit assumption of this measure is that it reflects the 
cost  of  the  most  basic  needs,  which  include  expenditures  for  food,  clothes  and 
housing (see World  Bank Institute  2005,  42).  However,  it  would be erroneous to 
assume that the poor spend their entire budget – as small as it may be – on food and 
basic necessities. As Banerrjee and Duflo (2007) find in their paper “The economic 
lives  of  the  poor”,  expenditures  for  food  amount  to  56  to  78  percent  of  total 
consumption of the poor, whereas considerable amounts are spent intoxicants, such 
as alcohol and tobacco, and entertainment, such as festivals or television. Despite 
such  criticism,  the  World  Bank  relies  on  this  monetary  approach  for  poverty 
measurement.  To  facilitate  international  comparisons,  the  amount  of  US$1  was 
converted into Purchasing Power Parities (PPP), resulting in US$1.45 in 2005 due to 
American inflation. Since this amount seemed rather high to World Bank researchers 
and policy makers and would imply significant changes in the global number of poor, 
the poverty line was recalculated in 2005 with the original method and finally, set at 
US$1.25  (PPP)  (see  The  Economist  2008,  www).  For  the  richer  middle  income 
countries, the poverty line was set at US$2 (PPP) per day, thus indicating “moderate 
poverty” (see World Bank 2009, www). 
The PPP approach is widely used not only by the World Bank, but also the IMF, other 
Multilateral Development Banks, and UN organizations. Although it seems attractive 
for helping to establish a common language among donors and researchers (see 
Werhane et  al.  2009,  10),  the PPP concept  remains controversial  and frequently 
leads to errors, notably because PPP exchange rates were originally not developed 
for  poverty  measurement  (see  Deaton  2004,  17).  Accused  of  being  inadequate, 
infrequently updated and inapplicable to the consumption to the poor, critics have 
repeatedly questioned the value of the PPP approach for the measurement of global 
poverty (ibid). Some critics even argue that the  “(…) PPP [approach] (…) reveals 
more  about  an  organization’s  ideological  commitment  for  or  against  globalization  
than it does about those who live in poverty” (Werhane et al. 2009, 10). Referring to 
converging national income averages, supporters of globalization tend to argue that 
global  poverty  is  declining.  Their  opponents,  however,  claim  that  the  economic 
expansion by multinational enterprises (MNEs), i.e. globalization, leads to widening 
income gaps between the rich and the poor. Inarguably, poverty measures based on 
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PPP may  be  useful  when  examining  the  global  economy  from  a  macro-view.  It 
remains  questionable,  however,  whether  it  is  an  accurate  tool  for  depicting  and 
addressing the problem of poverty (see Werhane et al. 2009, 11).
2.1.2 Biometric measures of poverty 
As alternative approach to the measurement of poverty, biometric measures focus on 
the cost to obtain a certain amount of calories - usually 2000 per day, as suggested 
by the Food and Agricultural  Organization of  the United Nations – to  calculate  a 
poverty line (see Deaton 2004, 4). Sometimes a 4000 calorie per day-norm is used 
for agricultural laborers. In other cases, distinctions are also made based on gender 
and age of the persons (see ibid). The determination of this poverty line can be done 
by assessing a person’s actual food expenditures matched by the income level at 
which, on average, 2000 calories are reached1 (see ibid, 5). 
A deficiency of biometric poverty measures is certainly that they do not account for 
the  nature  or  quality  of  calorie  intake.  They  usually  assume  that  by  consuming 
enough calories,  the person will  also take in sufficient protein and micronutrients, 
such as iodine, which are critical for human health (see ibid). 
Poverty lines based on biometric measures are widely used, not only because the 
poor spend a large proportion of their budget on nutrition, but also because there 
seems to be more political support for poverty reduction programs involving food than 
for measures based on less meritorious goods (see Deaton 2004, 5). The right to 
food is perceived more compelling than the right to any other goods. Furthermore, 
the nutritional basis and the involvement of scientists in setting the norms seem to 
add legitimacy to  such measurements  (see ibid).  Nonetheless,  national  biometric 
poverty  lines  are  often  flawed  because  they  were  only  adapted  to  changes  the 
national  price  level,  but  not  to  different  implications  of  people’s  contemporary 
economic activities. Nowadays, people need to consume fewer calories than in the 
past because jobs in industry or the service sector require less physical energy than 
manual  labor  in  agriculture.  Similar  points  of  critique can be applied  in  terms of 
differences between  the  calorie-need in  rural  versus  urban areas  (where  usually 
people are more sedentary, thus in need of fewer calories than on the countryside) or 
1  The method referred to is known as the “Calorie Engel Curve”.
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in colder versus hotter places. However, if such changes were taken into account, 
the poverty line would have to be revised upward, which would increase the number 
of people defined as poor. Unsurprisingly, there is typically little political support for 
such initiatives (see Deaton 2004, 7). 
2.1.3 Deprivation of capabilities 
A third definition of poverty refers to the issue as “the absence of one or more of the 
basic capabilities that are needed to achieve minimal functioning in the society in  
which one lives.” (Deaton 2004, 11) Economist and Nobel laureate Amartya Sen laid 
the theoretical foundations of this approach, arguing that the mere focus on monetary 
income is not enough to describe and measure the complexity of development and 
poverty alleviation. Sen essentially defines development as the expansion of human 
freedoms, which fulfill both, a constitutive and instrumental role, in the process (see 
Sen 1999, 36). He identifies five types of freedoms which directly enhance people’s 
capabilities, i.e. the things people can be and do, but also complement and reinforce 
one another (see Sen 1999, 38): 1) Political  Freedoms, i.e.  civil  rights to actively 
participate in politics through elections as well as open political dialogue and critique; 
2)  Economic  facilities,  i.e.  a  person’s  income,  relative  prices  and  functioning  of 
markets; 3) Social opportunities, i.e. access to education, health care and the like; 4) 
Transparency  guarantees,  with  are  to  prevent  people  from  corruption,  financial 
irresponsibility and underhand dealings; and 5) Protective Security, i.e. the provision 
of social safety nets for the most vulnerable groups of society.  
Amartya Sen’s  approach acknowledges that poverty  is relative to  the norms and 
customs of an individual’s respective society and therefore, not limited to developing 
countries. Although the poor of rich nations enjoy relatively high levels of income 
(when compared internationally), deprivation of one or more of the human freedoms 
mentioned  above,  such  as  lack  of  access  to  education  or  health  care,  may  still 
prevent them from the ability to fully participate in society (see ibid). 
Based  on  this  definition  of  poverty,  the  United  Nations  Development  Program 
(UNDP)  developed  a  more  complex  tool  for  poverty  measurement.  In  1990,  the 
Human Development Index was introduced as a new statistic, which accounted for 
social as well as economic development (see Human Development Reports, 2009, 
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www). It is composed of three components measuring life expectancy, educational 
attainment and income. Based on results for these indicators, UNDP determines a 
ranking  of  all  the countries in  the world  which  is  published in  its  annual  Human 
Development Report (see ibid). 
Although the HDI offers a more complete assessment of  poverty than single-fold 
measures,  critics  have  pointed  out  that  it  still  does  not  account  for  a  range  of 
variables, e.g. environmental factors, and therefore fails to capture the full complexity 
of the problem (see ibid).  
Also  drawing on Sen’s  broad definition  of  poverty,  the  General  Assembly  of  the 
United Nations adopted eight Millennium Development Goals in an unprecedented 
joint  declaration at  their  Millennium Summit  in  2000.  An important  merit  of  these 
Goals, which account for monetary variables as well as aspects related to health, 
education and the environment, is the fact that they are time-bound with the deadline 
of  2015  (see  UN  Millennium  Goals  2009,  www).  Drawing  on  unsatisfactory 
intermediate results, critics, however, doubt that the Millennium Development Goals 
will  be  achieved  by  the  designated  date  due  to  a  lack  of  political  will  and/or 
insufficient  financial  resources  for  development  (see  chapter  I.2.2)  (see 
Clemens/Moss  2004).  The  2007  midterm  review  of  the  MDGs  reveals  progress 
particularly in the areas of child mortality, education and women’s empowerment (see 
UN 2007, 4). The proportion of people living in extreme poverty has also declined 
notably  (from  one  third  to  about  one  fifth  of  total  world  population)  (see  ibid); 
however,  it  is  important  to  point  out  that  this  is  mainly  attributed  to  the  rapid 
development in South- and East-Asia. The poverty rate in Sub-Saharan Africa has 
not decreased nearly as much and will probably not be havened by 2015 (see ibid). 
These  unequal  developments  highlight  the  regional  differences  in  progress  and 
likeliness of achieving the MDGs on time. While it is still possible to meet the targets 
for  some  countries  and  world  regions,  the  outlook  for  others  is  rather  dire. 
Nevertheless the MDG concept merits appraisal as it represents a joint effort by the 
international community to increase support for development and became a widely 
accepted tool to depict the complexity of poverty, with each of the eight goals being 
divided  into  several  more  specific  and  measurable  targets  which  are  regularly 
monitored by UN authorities
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Source: UN Milliennium Goals 2009, www
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Table 1: United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)
GOALS TARGETS
Goal 1: Eradicate extreme 
poverty and hunger
- Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people whose income 
is less than $1 a day
- Achieve full and productive employment and decent work for all, 
including women and young people
-  Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people who suffer 
from hunger
Goal 2: Achieve universal 
primary education
- Ensure that, by 2015, children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will 
be able to complete a full course of primary schooling
Goal 3: Promote gender 
equality and empower 
women
- Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education, 
preferably by 2005, and in all levels of education no later than 2015
Goal 4: Reduce child 
mortality
- Reduce by two thirds, between 1990 and 2015, the under-five 
mortality rate
Goal 5: Improve maternal 
health
- Reduce by three quarters the maternal mortality ratio
- Achieve universal access to reproductive health
Goal 6: Combat 
HIV/AIDS, malaria and 
other diseases
- Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS
- Achieve, by 2010, universal access to treatment for HIV/AIDS for all 
those who need it
- Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the incidence of malaria 
and other major diseases
Goal 7: Ensure 
environmental 
sustainability
- Integrate the principles of sustainable development into country 
policies and programmes and reverse the loss of environmental 
resources
- Reduce biodiversity loss, achieving, by 2010, a significant reduction in 
the rate of loss
- Halve, by 2015, the proportion of the population without sustainable 
access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation
- By 2020, to have achieved a significant improvement in the lives of at 
least 100 million slum dwellers
Goal 8: Develop a global 
partnership for 
development
- Address the special needs of least developed countries, landlocked 
countries and small island developing states
- Develop further an open, rule-based, predictable, non-discriminatory 
trading and financial system
- Deal comprehensively with developing countries’ debt
- In cooperation with pharmaceutical companies, provide access to 
affordable essential drugs in developing countries
- In cooperation with the private sector, make available benefits of new 
technologies, especially information and communications
2.2 Market Failures versus Government Failures 
“Because no human institution is perfect, it is easy to find imperfections or ‘failures’” 
(Mitchell/Simmons 1994, xvii).
The issue of poverty is highly complex, in its definition as well as in its reasons and 
potential  solutions.  Although  acknowledging  the  importance  of  factors  such  as 
geography,  history,  cultural  idiosyncrasies  etc.  for  the  explanation  of  poverty  in 
particular  regions,  I  will  in  this  chapter  focus on the  theories  of  government  and 
market failures, which are frequently cited as obstacles to development.
2.2.1 Market Failures
Adam Smith’s  famous doctrine of  the invisible  hand claims that  “(…) maximizing 
behavior by individual economic agents in market relationships generates a socially  
rational  use  of  scarce  resources under  certain  defined conditions.  Moreover,  the  
voluntary exchange (…) through the market mechanism is itself a positive sum game  
for all  participants since exchange enhances mutual welfare” (Wallis/Dollery 1999, 
15).  This  assumption  of  the  homo economicus,  i.e.  perfectly  rational  and Pareto 
optimal human behavior in consumption and production seems to limit the necessity 
for active government intervention in the enforcement of property rights (see ibid). 
However, Neoclassical Economics or the magic of the “invisible hand” only works 
under certain conditions. Particularly, these are (see ibid, 17-21):
- Perfect competition  
However, in the real world various reasons exist for the absence or limitation 
of this assumption. Geographic isolation, limited ownership of certain goods 
such as natural resources or market entry barriers such as lacking economies 
of scale are prominent obstacles to perfect competition and often lead to the 
creation of (natural) monopolies or public provision of goods and services.
- Perfect information and no information asymmetries  
This  assumption  is  clearly  utopist,  leading  to  adverse  selection  and policy 
efforts to reduce it 
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- No externalities  
The concept of externalities implies that market prices do not reflect the total 
costs  and  benefits  for  society,  making  it  impossible  to  generate  socially 
efficient levels of consumption and production. In the real world, externalities 
(e.g. pollution) are inevitable and can at best tried to be internalized through 
taxes etc.
- Public goods  
Public  goods  are  characterized  by  non-rivalry  and  non-exclusivity  in 
consumption.  In  other  words,  the  consumption  of  a  public  good  by  one 
individual does not reduce the good’s availability for consumption by others 
and nobody can be prevented from consumption by the producer of the good. 
As private firms have no incentive to produce such goods, market failure is 
inevitable.
- Macroeconomic stability  
Efficient markets need a stable macroeconomic environment. This is however, 
threatened  by  periodic  downswings  in  economic  activity  related  to  the 
business  cycle.  Government  interventions  thus  seem  justified  to  foster 
economic  stability  and  prevent  unemployment  and  falling  incomes  during 
times of economic bust. 
As  explained  above,  it  is  hard  to  find  a  situation  in  the  real  world  in  which  all 
assumptions  hold.  Consequently,  market  failure  is  widespread  and  calls  for 
government intervention. Additionally, there are several ethical arguments supporting 
an active participation of government in the economy (ibid, 22-23):
- Efficient  markets  may  not  meet  socially  accepted  standards  of  equity  of 
income distribution or limit extremes of wealth and poverty
- People do not always behave in their own best interest. Merit goods are goods 
which might not be desired by the individual but rather by the society as a 
whole (e.g.  compulsory schooling,  vaccination campaigns etc)  and an thus 
justify public subsidies
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- Efficient  labor markets might not provide all  members of society with equal 
economic opportunity, irrespective of gender, race or ethnicity, further making 
the case for active policy involvement for the well-being of society
Other economic theories, such as (neo-) institutionalism, which evolved from and at 
the same time criticize neoclassical economics, offer an analysis of the institutional 
framework  in  which  markets  and economic  transactions  operate.  (In  neoclassical 
economics,  the institutional  framework is  a given assumption).  (Neo-)  institutional 
economics (NIE) draws attention to influences from the social environment, such as 
norms and rules enforced by political  or  other social  institutions, which affect  the 
behavior of otherwise rational, utility-maximizing individuals (see Gabler 2010, www). 
It also studies the ideal design of institutions which by laws and rules incentivize self-
interested individuals to cooperate for the maximum benefit for society. Yet, it is not 
able  to  identify  a  perfect  governance  structure  (see  ibid).  Importantly,  NIE  also 
introduced the concept of “boundend rationality”, rejecting once more the assumption 
of perfect information for economic actors (see ibid). 
2.2.2 Government Failures
“Adam Smith clearly recognized that the wealth of nations is substantially correlated  
with the wealth of wisdom in their political constitutions.”  (Wallis/Dollery 1999, 32) 
Just like markets,  political  and legislative systems are imperfect.  In particular,  the 
following sources of government failure have been found by public choice theory2:
- Legislative Failures  
These  are  allocative  inefficiencies  which  “(…)  arise  from  the  excessive 
provision  of  public  goods  as  politicians  pursue  strategies  designed  to  
maximize their chances of re-election rather than policies which would further  
the common good” (Wallis/Dollery 1999, 37) As a consequence, politicians try 
to  please certain  interest  groups with  the  provision  of  public  goods,  using 
strategies such as “logrolling”3, which eventually may lead to an oversupply of 
2  Public Choice Theory is a subset of positive political theory and applies analytic tools of economics to 
political science problems.
3  “Logrolling” here refers to the exchange of favors for mutual gain; especially the trading of influence or 
votes among politicians in order to win elections or pass certain legislations.
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public  goods  in  the  economy and  not  necessarily  foster  the  well-being  of 
society as a whole.
- Bureaucratic failures  
According  to  W.  Niskanen  (cited  in  Rosen  1991,  139)  public  servants  do 
usually not carry out beneficial public policies effectively because of a lack of 
right incentives. They will strive to maximize their budget in order to increase 
their public reputation, power and patronage (see ibid). The implementation of 
effective public policies might be secondary.
- Rent Seeking  
Given that government intervention in most cases implies a redistribution of 
wealth, bureaucrats tend to use the political system to allocate existing wealth 
toward themselves rather than to the benefit of society (see Rosen 1991, 149). 
This  is  a  common  explanation  for  government  growth  and  its  increasing 
intervention in the economy. 
- Inefficiencies in public good production    and delivery  
Unlike in the private sector, managers of public entities do not have to make a 
profit, which can lead to less efficient production and delivery processes (see 
Rosen 1991, 80). Moreover, if more (public or private) entities are involved 
(e.g.  via  sub-contracting)  the  flow  of  information  and  designation  of 
responsibilities  can become problematic.  These  phenomena are  known as 
principal-agent problems (see Rosen 1991, 84).
It has been recognized that “(…) although governments cannot create wealth per se 
they nevertheless  can play a key role  in  the  process of  economic  development”  
(Wallis/Dollery 1999, 55). Markets and governments are complimentary. Successful 
development of the private sector depends on appropriate institutional foundations 
set by the government whose role should essentially be an enabling one.
With this brief review of the theories of market and government failure, my aim is to 
stress that neither institution is  perfect  or  to  be preferred over the other.  On the 
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contrary, it is the right balance among sectors, the public and the private, which is 
able to produce the most desirable results for society and economy. This is also and 
especially true with regard to strategies for development aid and poverty reduction. 
2.3 Aid-based Strategies for Poverty Reduction
Traditionally,  efforts  to  reduce  global  poverty  have  aimed  at  providing  financial 
resources  to  public  or  private  recipients  in  the  Global  South.  During  the  past 
decades,  significant  amounts  have  been  donated  (and  lent)  by  governments  of 
wealthy  countries,  multilateral  institutions,  non-governmental  organizations  and 
individuals.  Nevertheless,  the  problem of  global  poverty  persists.  In  the  following 
chapter, I will provide an overview of aid-based strategies for poverty reduction as 
well as possible shortcomings. A section will also be dedicated to the “Aid debate” 
before turning to the role of private business in poverty alleviation in chapter 2.4.
2.3.1 Bilateral Foreign Aid
There are many ways in which bilateral development aid can be granted. It can be a 
direct  government-to-government  contribution  or  pass  through  intermediary 
organizations, such as the UN or the World Bank. Sometimes it is granted in the form 
of  specific  projects  in  the  recipient  country,  possibly  involving  the  private  sector 
and/or NGOs (see Werhane et al. 2009, 37) or by debt relief (see Easterly 2001, 
124).
Nonetheless, regardless of how the financial flows from the Global North to South are 
organized, it is important to note that bilateral aid is often used as an instrument of 
diplomacy (see Werhane et al. 2009, 37). Therefore, bilateral foreign aid is typically 
not only in the interest of the poor recipient, but also to the advantage of the rich 
donor government which can leverage this instrument to promote its own culture and 
language, for example, or, in some cases, strengthen its own industries. The latter is 
especially true when bilateral foreign aid is granted based on conditions set by the 
donor, such that the recipient is obliged to buy goods or services provided by the 
donor  in  return  for  the  aid  granted (see ibid).  Critics  argue that  such motives  of 
domestic  politics  actually  are  more  important  for  the  nature  and  amount  of  aid 
granted than the actual needs of the poor (see ibid). Yet,  some modern forms of 
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development aid, such as budget support,  allow for a transfer of public resources 
from a donor  country  to  the government in  the Global  South without  any strings 
attached.  The advantage of  such untied  aid  modalities  is  greater  freedom in  the 
allocation of resources according to national needs and priorities for the recipient, 
leading  to  improved  ownership  of  policy  reforms for  development  (see  UNCTAD 
2008, 3). However, their success critically depends on the legitimacy, efficiency and 
strength of institutions in the recipient country. If these criteria are not met, risks of 
corruption and misuse of funds prevail (see Wahlers 2008, 15), adding to the debate 
about the merits of development aid as well as the ideal amount (see chapter 2.3.4) 
2.3.2 Aid from Multilateral Organizations
Since  the  end  of  World  War  II,  a  number  of  multilateral  institutions  have  been 
established  with  the  goal  to  eradicate  poverty  and  promote  international 
development.   Within  a  broader  mandate,  they  also  play  an  important  role  as 
providers of development aid. The funding process varies for each institution, but 
since they are all governmental organizations, all of them depend, at least in part, on 
contributions from member governments which, in the case of rich nations, usually 
account for nearly half of the aid budget (see Farlex 2009, www).
The United Nations (UN)
With social and economic development as one of its core competencies, the United 
Nations  is  one  of  the  major  authorities  in  development  aid  and  policy.  For  that 
purpose, a number of specialized subordinate bodies have been created, such as the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Committee for 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC)  etc.  However,  policies  for  poverty  reduction  efforts  are  essentially 
generated within the UN’s Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), also the origin 
of the Millennium Development Goals (see chapter 2.1.3) (see Werhane et al. 2009, 
31).  With  the  adoption  of  the  MDGs,  the  UN  not  only  set  a  milestone  in  the 
development discourse and measurement, but also established a framework for the 
strategic disbursement of development aid. Although the international organization 
assumes a leadership role in achievement of the MDGs by 2015, success ultimately 
depends on the political will and commitment of its member states (see Werhane et 
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al. 2009, 34). The provision of financial development aid is critical in this respect. 
Therefore,  the  UN  invited  government  officials  as  well  as  representatives  from 
International  Financial  Institutions,  the  private  sector  and  civil  society  to  the  first 
International  Conference  on  Financing  for  Development  in  Monterrey,  Mexico  in 
2002.  In  the  so  called  “Monterrey  Consensus”,  the  international  community 
committed  to  increase  resources  for  development,  improve  the  situation  of 
developing countries in the global trading and financial system and agreed upon a 
process of debt relief for the poorest countries (UN 2002, 3f). A follow up conference 
was held in Doha,  Qatar in 2008,  confirming the commitment  of  the international 
community and specifying future actions (UN 2010, www). As demonstrated by the 
Financing  for  Development  Intitiative,  the  UN  plays  an  active  role  in  poverty 
reduction.  However,  its  resources  are  extremely  limited  and  entirely  depend  on 
contributions from its 192 member states (see UN 2009, www). Economist Jeffrey 
Sachs is currently in charge of the UN’s effort to reach the MDGs. Being a fierce 
defender of foreign aid, he essentially calls for a major infusion of foreign capital into 
developing countries through intermediaries, such as the World Bank (see Werhane 
et al. 2009, 33). According to his theory, official development assistance (ODA) will 
accelerate  the  process  of  capital  accumulation  in  the  Global  South,  which  will 
eventually raise the level of capital per person and lead to an end of poverty by 2025 
(see Sachs 2005). 
International Financial Institutions (IFIs) 
For  the  purposes of  this  paper,  the  term International  Financial  Institutions  (IFIs) 
refers  to  the  Bretton  Woods  Institutions  –  the  World  Bank  and  the  International 
Monetary  Fund  –  and  regional  Multilateral  Development  Banks,  such  as  the 
European  Bank  for  Reconstruction  and  Development  (EBRD),  the  African 
Development Bank (ADB) and the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), which 
will be discussed in more detail later. 
Although the specific mandate may vary among these institutions, they all share a 
common goal and  raison d’être: the promotion of economic development and fight 
against poverty (see United Nations 2009, www).  To achieve this goal, they engage 
in extensive development research and policy advice, additional to their primary role 
as providers of financing for developing countries. Besides non-concessional loans, 
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which account  for  the major part  of  the World Bank’s capital  flows to developing 
countries, it also provides a substantial amount (US$14 billion in 2009) of grants, i.e. 
non-reimbursable  financial  assistance,  to  the  80  poorest  nations  through  its  IDA 
(International Development Association) window (see World Bank 2009, 55). In the 
case of the IMF, financial assistance is almost exclusively provided in the form of 
short-term  loans  to  governments  with  the  purpose  of  adjusting  their  balance-of-
payments (see Werhane et al.  2009, 35).  The 2009 lending volume amounted to 
SDR4 1.8 billion (see IMF, 2009, 10). The IMF collaborates intensively with the World 
Bank and the United Nations in poverty reduction, particularly through its country-
assessments and poverty reduction strategies (see Werhane et al. 2009, 35). 
Another  important  institution,  the  World  Trade  Organization seeks  to  foster 
international  development  through  the  promotion  of  free  trade  and  economic 
integration on a global level (see WTO 2009, www). Although it  does not directly 
disburse  large  amounts  of  financial  aid,  it  frequently  bears  the  costs  for  training 
sessions for officials hailing from developing countries. The available budget for such 
activities amounts to approx. 30 million Swiss francs annually (see ibid). The WTO 
also works closely with the IFIs and UN institutions. 
Unlike in the case of bilateral aid, financial assistance from multilateral organizations 
is  less  dependent  on  the  national  interest  of  one  particular  donor  country. 
Nonetheless, given that the highest decision-making bodies of these institutions are 
made  up  of  representatives  for  the  respective  member  governments,  political 
influence is certainly important. All  these financial institutions essentially support a 
free-market based model of economic development through the promotion of large-
scale  economic  growth  (see  Werhane  et  al.  2009,  37).  Despite  many  efforts  to 
eliminate world poverty over the decades, however, their success has been limited 
as global poverty still prevails. On the contrary, they have frequently been criticized 
as overly bureaucratic, elitist, conservative and even self-serving (see Yunus 2007, 
11)  institutions  pursuing  not  always  consistent  policies.  Another  point  of  critique 
addresses their top-down approach to development which tends to objectify the poor 
(see Yunus 2007, 12) rather than giving them the opportunity to actively participate in 
the overcoming of poverty.
4  SDR (Special Drawing Rights) is an international reserve asset, artificially created by the IMF in 1969 
based on four currencies (US $, Yen, Euro and British Pound). 
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2.3.3 Private Philanthropy
Spurred by a moral obligation to share their own wealth with the underprivileged of 
the world, some individuals in the Global North have made significant donations to 
developing countries. Often times intermediaries like charitable organizations, NGOs 
or churches are involved in such investments (see  Werhane et al. 2009, 38)., The 
tradition of private philanthropy seems to be more developed in the United States 
than in any other country of the Global North. In 2006, private philanthropic donations 
for development amounted to US$ 34.8 billion, compared to US$ 23.5 billion official 
government aid (Hudson Institute 2009, 17). Unlike the IFIs, whose conception and 
approach to  global  poverty  is  primarily  related to  finance and economics,  NGOs, 
when trying  to  attract  individual  philanthropists,  tend  to  present  the  issue with  a 
“human  face”,  using  compelling  stories  about  individual  cases  as  well  as 
emergencies or disasters (see Werhane et al. 2009, 40). In this way philanthropic 
agencies intend to make donors believe that their investment is not only personal and 
urgent  but  also  unavailable  from  other  sources,  such  as  official  development 
assistance (which is typically presented as ineffective or inefficient) (see ibid). Many 
of these private initiatives are also highly specialized on a particular development 
issue, e.g.  The Global  Fund to  fight  AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria,  The Global 
Alliance for Improved Nutrition or Education International.  However, just as in the 
case of public resources, there remains a risk that private donations will eventually 
not reach the poor due to bureaucratic inefficiencies or misuse of funds. 
2.3.4 The Aid Debate
During  the  last  50  years,  governments  in  the  Global  North  have  provided  over 
US$2.3 trillion in economic and humanitarian aid to their  developing counterparts 
(see Easterly 2006, 11). In addition, large amounts of development aid have been 
provided by multilateral organizations and private individuals. 
While some scholars still argue, that this amount is only a fraction of what would be 
needed  to  definitely  end  global  poverty  (see  Sachs  2005),  others  call  for  new 
strategies  for  development,  rejecting  the  concept  of  foreign  aid  as  a  whole  (see 
Easterly  2006;  Moyo  2009).  This  dispute,  also  known  as  the  “aid  debate”,  has 
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become increasingly  prominent  in  recent  years  involving  scholars  and celebrities 
from the Global North and South (see Pfutze 2007, 8). 
The group of aid advocates following UN economist Jeffrey Sachs criticize that too 
little aid has been given in the past and that governments in the Global North have a 
moral obligation to increase donations for realistically ending poverty in the poorest 
countries (see Sachs 2005). In this spirit, leaders of the G8 countries agreed to a 
substantial  increase  of  development  aid  at  the  2005  summit  in  Gleneagles  (see 
Collier 2007, 100) and the European Union set the collective goal of increasing the 
level of development aid to 0.56 percent of GNP by 2010 for its member states, on 
the way to the UN target of 0.7 percent by 2015 (see Eurostat 2009, www). However, 
overall compliance with the pursuit of this goal is unsatisfactory, as is evident from 
the following table. 
Source: OECD 2010, www
Figure 1: Net ODA in 2008 as a percentage of GNI
On  the  other  hand,  aid  critics,  such  as  former  World  Bank  economist  William 
Easterly, claim that development aid more often results the opposite rather than the 
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desired effect. Instead of spurring growth and reducing poverty, it would encourage 
corruption,  foster  dependency  and  eventually  prevent  poor  economies  from 
developing (see Moyo 2008). Another controversy exists concerning the nature of 
development  aid;  if  it  should  rather  be  granted  in  the  form  of  loans  or  grants, 
conditional or without any strings attached (see Easterly 2006).  
Fundamental  critics,  however,  are  convinced  that,  regardless  of  the  nature  of 
financial assistance, due to bureaucratic red tape of aid agencies and governments 
or severe misuse of funds, the major part of development aid does not actually reach 
the poor.  Backing their  arguments with some statistical  evidence,  e.g.  the Global 
Accountability Report (see One World 2008), they pledge for the discontinuation of 
traditional  aid and propose new models of  development cooperation with  a more 
active role of countries in the Global South and different criteria for aid disbursement 
(see Easterly 2006). 
Some scholars, such as Collier (2007) occupy a more pragmatic “middle” position 
between aid advocates and opponents.  Although generally supporting the idea of 
financial development aid, he criticizes the way in which it has been granted in the 
past  and pledges for  new standards  and criteria  for  aid  disbursement  based on 
transparency and good governance. Moreover, he emphasizes that aid alone cannot 
be a solution for the end of global poverty.  
2.4 The contribution of business to Poverty Reduction
“(…)[B]usiness contributions to poverty reduction are imperative if the challenges to  
peace and sustainability are to be seriously addressed.” (Boyle/Boguslaw 2007, 113)
Poverty  Reduction  has  traditionally  been  considered  the  responsibility  of  the 
government and non-governmental or non-profit sectors (see Boyle/Boguslaw 2007, 
115). However, with a decline in confidence in the role of the state as an agent for 
development (see Jenkins 2005, 529), increasing globalization and interdependence 
of economies and the limited success of traditional strategies for poverty alleviation 
(see  chapter  2.3),  the  private  sector  seems  to  be  emerging  as  an  ever  more 
important actor in society. This tendency was essentially fostered by the policies of 
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the “Washington Consensus”5 which promoted extensive liberalization, deregulation 
and a drastically reduced role for the state in economies in the Global South (see 
Jenkins 2005). As a consequence to the limited scope of the public sector, “(…) firms 
are now being called upon to go beyond their traditional role of generating economic  
growth (and thus indirectly helping goals such as poverty alleviation) toward playing 
a more direct role in [development].” (see Frynas 2008, 275) This call  for greater 
involvement of private firms in poverty reduction also reflects the growing importance 
of the resources of the private sector, e.g. in the form of foreign direct investment 
(FDI) relative to official development assistance (ODA) to developing countries. The 
amounts of FDI already outpace ODA by a factor of three to one (see Jenkins 2005, 
529). Drawing further parallels between the public and the private sector as actors in 
development,  the UN special  envoy for  HIV/Aids in  Africa proposed in  2005 that 
MNCs contribute 0.7 percent of their annual pre-tax revenues to combating HIV/Aids. 
This  figure  corresponds  to  the  UN  target  for  developed  nations’  contribution  to 
development aid as a proportion of GDP (see White/Jack 2005, www). 
Recognizing the increasing importance of the private sector as actor in society, the 
United Nations in 2000 reached out to companies with the launching of the “Global 
Compact”  as a broad-based policy initiative for  businesses that are committed to 
aligning their  operations and strategies with principles of  good governance in the 
areas  of  human  rights,  labor,  the  environment  and  anti-corruption  (see  Global 
Compact  2009,  www).  Besides the  mainstreaming  of  these principles,  which  are 
derived from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ILO’s Declaration on 
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, the Rio Declaration on the Environment 
and Development, and the UN convention against Corruption, the Global Compact 
seeks to catalyze business action toward the support of other UN goals, notably the 
Millennium Development Goals (see ibid). Although the Global Compact represents a 
voluntary initiative which is not legally binding for the companies, it can be regarded 
as an important campaign to raise awareness for the role of the private sector in 
development and poverty reduction. 
5  The term “Washington Consensus” was originally coined by economist John Williamson to describe a 
list  of  ten  market-liberal  policy  reforms  to  be  promoted  by  the  Washington-based  International 
Financial Institutions in 1989 (see Williamson 2004)
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In addition to the UN, other national  and multilateral  development agencies have 
increasingly addressed companies as actors in  development,  expecting “(…) that 
businesses will make long-term investments, and success will be measured not only  
through profits but through an improved business environment that is characterized  
by stability, security and peace, and by environmental and economic sustainability.” 
(Boyle/Boguslaw 2007, 118) In this way, Brainard (2006) is convinced that “(…) the 
private  sector  can  bring  to  the  fight  against  global  poverty  the  same  spirit  of  
leadership, innovation, and initiative – and the same skills in scaling size up, driving  
costs down, and reaching out to new clients – that success in the global marketplace 
requires”(p.3).
Nonetheless, concerns remain with respect to the role of business in development. In 
their efforts, firms can be tempted to prioritize their own interest over the well-being of 
society, which might eventually result in little positive, or even negative, contribution 
to  development (see Reed/Reed 2009,  4).  Furthermore,  as a  policy paradigm,  a 
leading role  of  the private  sector  in development might  contribute to  legitimate a 
regime of business self-regulation which not necessarily fosters poverty alleviation, 
lacks accountability and transparency (see ibid). Fundamental critics thus insist that 
the responsibility  for  firms to  engage in poverty  reduction should not  exceed the 
scope for which they can be held accountable for (see Jenkins 2005). However, as 
empirical  evidence  for  these  accusations  is  scarce  and  an  evaluation  would  go 
beyond the scope of this paper, I will rather point out a variety of corporate actions in 
the field of poverty reduction with its differences concerning the concept, potential for 
success and social power relations. 
Corporate activities in the field of poverty reduction can take different forms, from 
philanthropic donations, to business partnerships with the public or non-profit sector 
to innovative approaches including poor people into the core operations and value 
chain of  a  business.  After  explaining the rationale for  firms to  engage in poverty 
reduction, I will elaborate on each of the different activities in the following chapter. 
2.4.1 The rationale for business to engage in Poverty Reduction 
Debates about the role and responsibility of the private sector in society have been 
going  for  decades.  While  Milton  Friedman  (1970)  argues  that  the  only  social 
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responsibility  for  business  is  to  increase  its  profits,  other  scholars  find  that 
corporations as social institutions have an obligation to make broader contributions to 
the improvement of a society’s wellbeing (see Brainard 2006, 16). R. Hahn (2009), 
for  instance,  draws  upon  the  concept  of  Corporate  Citizenship6 to  argue  that 
corporations have an ethical obligation to engage in poverty alleviation. Justification 
for such action may be found in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UN, 
1948) which explicitly says that  “[every individual and every organ of society] has 
duties  to  the  community  in  which  alone  the  free  and  full  development  (…)  is  
possible”. This definition clearly includes private players such as MNEs. According to 
this theory, governments are no longer the only guarantors of social, civil and political 
rights,  but  that  the  private  sector  increasingly  assumes  responsibility  for  the 
protection  thereof  while  at  the  same time developing  a  corporate  stake in  these 
relations.  Consequently,  corporations  take  actions  which  have  traditionally  been 
associated  with  the  public  domain,  such  as  providing  a  minimum  of  economic 
welfare, security, education and health (see ibid). In some cases, corporate codes of 
conduct can be an effective protection of social rights when governmental standards 
are not sufficient (see ibid). 
Besides moral reasons for engaging in poverty reduction, business may also have an 
own genuine interest in becoming active in this field. Initiatives of Corporate Social 
Responsibility or Corporate Philanthropy are expected to have a positive impact on 
the  reputation  and  customer  loyalty  for  firms;  yet  the  value  for  society  of  such 
initiatives  is  sometimes  questionable  (see  Brainard  2006,  17  and  chapter  2.3). 
Nonetheless, a growing number or business leaders seem to redefine business value 
beyond  pure  shareholder  value  and  include  social  values  into  core  business 
strategies (see chapter 2.4.4) to substantially foster international development and 
poverty reduction (see Brainard 2006, 17). Such enterprises are known to operate 
according to a “triple bottom line”, i.e. they develop competitive corporate strategies 
which at  the same time deliver economic, social  and environmental benefits (see 
Hart  2005,  15).  Poverty  in  all  its  manifestations,  of  poor  education  and  health, 
delinquency, crime and unstable local and regional economic development, directly 
affects  business  activities  in  a  negative  way  (see  Boyle/Boguslaw  2007,  103), 
6  Hahn’s understanding of “Corporate Citizenship” refers to the fact that the private sector assumes 
increasing responsibility  for the guarantee of social,  civil  and political  citizenship rights in today’s 
societies, thereby complementing and replacing the respective role of governments. 
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demonstrating all the more the private sectors’ stake in resolving this global issue. 
Some scholars, such as C.K. Prahalad even argue that both goals, the corporate one 
of  generating  profits  and  the  societal  one  of  alleviating  poverty,  can  be  met 
simultaneously. 
In what follows, I will further elaborate on the different forms of business engagement 
in efforts of poverty reduction.
2.4.2 Policy Dialogue 
A rather indirect way of working toward the alleviation of poverty is the engagement 
of business in governance7 issues and rule-setting (see Reed/Reed 2009, 16). “The 
privatization  of  governance  has  led  to  a  situation  in  which  political  power  and  
institutional capability are less and less rooted in formal constitutional powers, and  
increasingly derived instead from a capacity to wield and coordinate resources from 
a variety of state and non-state actors” (Prieto-Carron et al. 2006, 985). Businesses 
have thus increasingly  engaged in  policy dialogue and lobbying for  changes that 
affect  economic as  well  as social  policy.  Unofficially,  they  have long become an 
accepted political  player (see Hahn 2009, 318).  Unlike strategies which intend to 
make the goal  of  poverty reduction part  of  the core business activity,  “(…) [T]he 
activist/advocate approach requires firms to engage in the policy process rather than  
try  to  solve  the  problem  of  poverty  themselves” (Boyle/Boguslaw  2007,  111). 
Companies can resist  corruption,  advocate human rights  and promote  change in 
public policies, alone or through multi-stakeholder initiatives, i.e. in collaboration with 
other  businesses,  NGOs  or  international  (governmental)  organizations  (see  ibid). 
Such  advocacy  for  social  issues  implies  a  new  role  for  companies  (see  ibid). 
Although some assert it an important potential for societal change, it implies some 
serious legitimacy issues as MNEs lack the legitimization procedures of state actors 
(see  van  Heerdenn/Bosson,  2006,  38)  and  are  often  accused  of  a  lack  of 
transparency  and  accountability  in  their  actions  (see  ibid).  This  is  particularly 
problematic  in  cases  where  corporations  abuse  their  influence  on  official  public 
decision  makers  and  put  downward  pressure  on  wages  and  working  conditions, 
7  With “Governance”, I refer to the “coordination and coherence among a wide variety of actors with  
different purposes and objectives, such as political actors and institutions, corporate interests, civil  
society  and transnational  organizations.”  (Prieto-Carron/Lund-Thomsen/Chan/Muro/Bhushan,  2006, 
985)
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avoid taxes and lobby against social and environmental regulation (see Prieto-Carron 
et al., 2006, 985). Furthermore, corporations have tended to advocate for voluntary 
codes  of  conduct  and  certifying  initiatives  rather  than  legally  binding  business 
regulation (see Boyle/Boguslaw 2007, 113) and supported the privatization of public 
goods  and  services,  which  might  not  always  be  in  the  best  interest  of  poverty 
reduction (see Reed/Reed 2009, 16). 
Evidently, MNCs are powerful players in the global economy with a potentially large 
influence on politics and society.  Progress in the alleviation of  global  poverty  will 
critically depend on how this influence is exercised. If corporations actively work to 
strengthen the ability of governments to reduce poverty (see Boyle/Boguslaw 2007, 
116)  and  strive  to  facilitate  social  dialogue  among  their  stakeholders  toward  a 
creation of effective “multi-stakeholder initiatives”8, their contribution to global poverty 
reduction can indeed be significant.
2.4.3 Corporate Social Responsibility and Corporate Philanthropy
Corporate Social Responsibility, defined as “a concept whereby companies integrate 
social  and  environmental  concerns  in  their  business  operations  and  in  their  
interaction  with  their  stakeholders  on  a  voluntary  basis”  (European  Commission 
2001,  6),  was originally  an  initiative  adopted by  individual  companies  in  the  late 
1990s (see Jenkins 2007, 529) In the attempt of avoiding legally binding regulations, 
MNCs  and  governments  of  the  Global  North  proposed  self-regulation  as  an 
alternative for business conduct (see Jenkins 2005, 527). However, given that such 
activities “are voluntary,  discretionary and dispersed across various nation states,  
accountability is difficult if not impossible” (Boyle/Boguslaw 2007, 115). As of now, 
there exists no mechanism to hold companies accountable for their promises made 
(see ibid). This is why CSR has been frequently criticized as serving only corporate 
interests, primarily “(…) as a public relations tool, a way to deflect criticism, engage  
critics and potentially capitalize on emerging business opportunities associated with 
doing, and being seen to be doing, good” (Newell/Frynas 2007, 670), instead of truly 
contributing to the wellbeing of society at large. 
8  “Multi  Stakeholder  Initiatives”  are  forums  or  organizations  that  include  various  parties  such  as 
companies, NGOs, trade unions, and government agencies and can take different forms, for example 
as  learning  forums  (e.g.  the  UN  Global  Compact)  or  certification  bodies  (e.g.  the  Fair  Labor 
Organization). (see van Heerdenn/Bosson, 2006, 43)
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Traditionally,  CSR activities  have been concentrated in  areas of  labor  rights  and 
environmental issues; over the last years, however, with an emerging role for the 
private  sector  in  development,  CSR  goals  have  increasingly  been  linked  to 
international development and poverty alleviation (see Jenkins 2005). This tendency 
has largely been supported by the UN Global Compact, the MDBs which launched 
their own initiatives to foster CSR activities in this field and national development 
agencies. Nevertheless, critics often point out that the impact of CSR programs is 
insignificant except for a limited number of rather specific cases (see Boyle/Boguslaw 
2007,  114)  because  such  initiatives  are  usually  not  only  employed  without  prior 
consultations with affected stakeholders in society (see van Heerdenn/Bosson, 2009, 
40) but are also conditional on aligning with the overarching business mandate to 
generate profits and because they are often misused by companies for marketing 
purposes (see Yunus 2007, 17). Limitations of CSR activities seem to be all the more 
evident in the area of international development and poverty reduction (see  Prieto-
Carron et al., 2006). In addition to a lack of accountability, CSR efforts to alleviate 
poverty are often bound to fail due to a lack of corporate commitment and the conflict 
of interest between short-term financial profits and the need for long-term investment 
in poverty reduction. Furthermore, given that CSR agendas are still  dominated by 
environmental  or  human  rights  issues,  respective  corporate  action  is  currently 
predominantly defined in negative terms,  i.e.  by actions firms should  not do (like 
harming the environment, employing child labor, disregarding labor standards etc.) 
whereas a focus on poverty reduction would require a more positive commitment, 
such as discriminating in favor of the poor in employment to include them into the 
formal economy (see Jenkins 2005, 540). Currently, MNCs employ often only few 
local (poor) people in countries of the Global South. As most of these corporations 
also do not produce goods for the poor, which could be provided to them at lower 
costs by “socially responsible pricing”, the poor don’t have a stake in the company as 
producers  or  consumers  (see  ibid).  Given  the  central  role  of  a  company’s 
stakeholders in any corporate activity, as well as in CSR, the fact that the poor are 
excluded from such strategic decisions severely undermines the potential of CSR to 
significantly contribute to poverty reduction (see ibid). 
Most importantly, however, poverty reduction strategies based on CSR or corporate 
philanthropy do not contribute to a structural change in society which would allow the 
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poor  to  exit  the  vicious  cycle  of  poverty  (see  Prieto-Carron  et  al.,  2006)  or  the 
“poverty trap” (see Collier 2007). This also explains why “[c]orporate practices such 
as transfer pricing, tax avoidance or the abuse of market power are not part of the 
CSR mainstream” (Jenkins 2005, 528). Likewise, potential ideological underpinnings 
of CSR, the actual agenda setting (i.e. which issues are included or excluded from 
CSR initiatives) as well as the absence of gender, class and race in CSR issues are 
debatable  and  demonstrate  limitations  of  this  corporate  approach  to  poverty 
reduction (see Prieto-Carron et al., 2006, 979). 
The fact  that  there currently  exist  no methodologies to  systematically  assess the 
impact of CSR on poverty reduction once again stresses the shortcomings in the 
evaluability  of  CSR actions and the possibility  to hold companies accountable for 
their acts or omissions. As of today, we lack appropriate tools to rank multinational 
companies  in  terms  of  their  CSR  activities  or  to  systematically  compare  CSR 
initiatives of different companies within the same industry (see ibid, 987). 
2.4.4 Core Business Activity
Apart from engagement in poverty reduction through lobbying or CSR, some private 
sector  organizations  have  declared  poverty  alleviation  as  a  corporate  priority  by 
including it into the core business activities. The essential difference of this approach 
is  that  it  does  not  rely  on  the  benevolent  intent  of  executives  or  philanthropic 
expenses (perhaps at the same time intended to improve the company’s image) but 
that it effectively seeks to combine the company’s mandate to generate profits with 
the goal to reduce poverty. On a more philosophical note, this reflects Stuart Hart’s 
(2005) vision of a “(…) new, more inclusive form of commerce (…) that lifts the entire  
human family” and contributes to a sustainable future.
In what follows, I am going to present three different organizational forms which aim 
to fulfill this double-mandate:
2.4.4.1 Social Entrepreneurships 
Although some scholars (e.g. Yunus 2007, 31) clearly differentiate between the terms 
“Social Entrepreneurship” and “Social Business”, defining the latter as a subcategory 
of the broad endeavor of “Social Entrepreneurship” which accordingly describes “(…) 
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any innovative idea to help people (…)” (ibid), I will use the terms synonymously, as 
do Werhane et al., Boyle/Boguslaw etc.. By their definition, social entrepreneurships 
are businesses with a social mission, i.e. with the goal to create value for the society 
at  large  and  not  just  for  their  shareholders  (see  Werhane  et  al.  2009,  118; 
Boyle/Boguslaw 2007, 110).  They often attempt to tackle problems such as lacking 
access  to  infrastructure,  water  and  sanitation,  health  services  etc.  A  prominent 
example for a social enterprise is the microfinance institution Grameen Bank founded 
by  Nobel  Prize  winner  Muhammed  Yunus  with  the  explicit  purpose  of  reducing 
poverty among the rural poor in Bangladesh (see ibid). Social enterprises can either 
be organized as commercial for-profit organizations, as NGOs or as hybrids. While 
the Grameen Bank is a traditional for-profit venture, one of its spin-off, the Grameen 
Foundation, a US-based NGO providing assistance to micro-lending start-ups, relies 
on donations for its financing (see Werhane et al. 2009, 118).  
Social  enterprises can become models applying best  business practices in  many 
ways: creating favorable working conditions for their employees, favoring long-term 
sustainability  over  short-term  profits,  partnering  with  other  public  and  private 
institutions in formulating and implementing a comprehensive approach to poverty 
reduction (see Boyle/Brainard 2007, 117). Their defining characteristic is to generate 
social  change and improvement of  social  capital9 through well-managed business 
activities (see Werhane et al. 2009, 119). 
Another form of social entrepreneurship is community-based business, also known 
as  co-operatives.  Such  ventures  usually  originate  in  communities  facing  difficult 
circumstances such as a market collapse, unemployment or environmental disasters 
with the purpose to improve the situation for the community members through their 
immediate  involvement  (see  Werhane  et  al.  et  al  2009,  119).  Constitutive  for 
community-based enterprises is that they are integral to the community since they 
are  essentially  created  by  “(…)  community  members  acting  corporately”  (ibid)  to 
meet their common economic, social, and cultural needs through a jointly-owned and 
democratically-controlled enterprise (see ICA, 2009, www). Co-operatives are based 
on  the  values  of  self-help,  self-responsibility,  democracy,  equality,  equity  and 
solidarity  (see ibid).  The community  of  LLocllapampa in  Peru has established an 
9  In this context, “Social capital” refers to the well-being of a community or social ecosystem (see 
Werhane et al. 2009, 119) 
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enterprise  of  such  type  for  its  agricultural  activities.  By  working  as  a  unit,  the 
community has been very successful  in improving its technology, productivity and 
technical know-how of its members (see Werhane et al. 2009, 119). 
Foundations,  such  as  Ashoka or  Avina,  have  supported  the  work  of  social 
entrepreneurs  through  stipends,  professional  contacts  and  access  to  a  global 
network of peers to foster exchange and promote ideas for inclusive private sector 
development (see Ashoka 2010, www; Avina 2010, www). 
2.4.4.2 Public-Private-Partnerships (PPPs)
Public-Private-Partnerships (PPPs)  “(…) can be defined as arrangements whereby 
private parties participate in, or provide support for, the provision of infrastructure,  
and  a  PPP  project  results  in  a  contract  for  a  private  entity  to  deliver  public  
infrastructure-based services” (Grimsey/Lewis 2004, 13). “The role of business is to 
improve the efficiency of the delivery of public services, while the regulatory role of  
government is to ensure that efficiency gains are passed on to the public and that  
access and affordability are maintained for vulnerable sectors of society” (Reed/Reed 
2009, 13)
The Public-Private-Partnership approach thus represents a more traditional form of 
corporate engagement in poverty reduction as it does not require any specific sense 
of social responsibility (see Reed/Reed 2009, 13) but can be described as a form of 
sub-contracting  from  the  government.  With  economic  liberalization  as  the 
predominant policy paradigm, this business concept grew increasingly popular in the 
Global North as well as South during the 1990s (see Reed/Reed 2009, 5) and found 
implementation in a variety of sectors, ranging from transportation and electricity to 
telecommunications,  health  and  water  (see  Grimsey/Lewis  2004,221).  Given  the 
incapacity of governments in the Global South to sufficiently invest in the provision of 
public goods, development institutions such as the UN, the World Bank and others 
have increasingly promoted PPPs as a policy alternative (see ibid).
However, private investment in developing countries faces much higher institutional 
risks than in countries in the Global North. Legal and regulatory frameworks are often 
incomplete or unstable, and payment for the services delivered is not always ensured 
due to  the lack of  financial  resources (see Grimsey/Lewis 2004,  221).  Moreover, 
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governments  in  the  Global  South  usually  lack  the  experience with  private  sector 
involvement in the provision of public goods and have limited capabilities to deal with 
MNEs  (see  ibid).  Likewise,  MNEs  often  have  limited  knowledge  about  the 
implications for business in the Global South (see Werhane et al. 2009, 107). Due to 
these obstacles, it is questionable whether PPPs in countries in the Global South 
have  actually  met  their  expectations  and  significantly  contributed  to  a  positive 
development. In fact, in the corporate world it has been estimated that nearly 50% of 
all partnerships either underperform or fail (see Brainard 2006, 22). Although, during 
the past  15 years,  PPP arrangements  have become increasingly  popular  for  the 
provision of infrastructure in developing countries, only 20-25 % of total investment 
has actually been provided by the private sector,  drawing upon institutional risks, 
such as long pay-back periods or difficulties in collecting cost-recovering tariffs (see 
Reed/Reed 2009, 15). These factors further increase the cost of capital in the Global 
South which ultimately requires charging the local, poor population more than their 
counterpart  in  the  Global  North  (see  ibid).  To  ensure  that  their  costs  are  being 
covered, corporations have made use of a number of measures, such as prepaid 
meters, cutting off informal connections, suing defaulters etc. (see ibid), which may 
well have proven effective in cost-recovery, however, even less so in altering living 
standards  for  the  poor  who were  deprived of  essential  services.  Likewise,  many 
governments in the Global South have failed to ensure equal access and affordability 
of services for all segments of society, most notably because of their own shortage of 
fiscal resources and incapacity to provide adequate subsidies (see ibid). It is also not 
clear if increased involvement of business in the provision of public goods has had an 
impact on fighting corruption in the public sector (see Reed/Reed 2009, 15), another 
common expectation from PPPs. 
Nonetheless,  combined  efforts  between  the  public  sector,  which  “(…)  can  help 
corporations  gain  policy  access  to  governments,  provide  convening  authority,  
mitigate risk, and share significant accumulated expertise in developing countries”  
(Brainard 2006, 22),  and private business, characterized by its operational  savvy, 
ability to organize and capability to create value for the poor, can be a promising 
approach to global poverty reduction if potential partnerships are based on “(…) open 
communication,  transparency,  clarity  of  roles  and  ground  rules,  and  regular  
opportunities for evaluation” (ibid, 23). Yet, the success of PPPs largely depends on 
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the  specific  circumstances,  which  is  why  critics  have  argued  that,  “(…) while 
privatization is not necessarily inappropriate in some cases, there is no justification  
for  international  bodies  to  actively  promote  privatization  on  the  basis  that  it  will  
improve infrastructure deficiencies in the South” (Budds 2003 In Reed/Reed 2009, 
16).
2.4.4.3 Inclusive business: Bottom-of-the-Pyramid Models
Probably more than any of the approaches mentioned above, the relatively young 
concept  of  inclusive  business  essentially  foresees  an  active,  leading  role  of 
multinational corporations in poverty alleviation. The improvement of living conditions 
of the poor is an explicit corporate goal for inclusive businesses and integral part of 
their value chain (see UNDP 2009, www). 
According  to  this  approach,  championed  by  C.K.  Prahalad  (2005),  the  poor  are 
considered as an underserved or untapped market with a huge potential for a win-win 
situation for business as well as society: By entering into these markets, corporations 
have an opportunity to generate profits while at the same time improving the living 
standards of the impoverished through the delivery of goods and services and/or the 
creation of employment. Moreover, the idea is to use the Bottom of the Pyramid as a 
source of entrepreneurship and innovation where economic activity can be fostered 
by corporations from the bottom-up (see Boyle/Boguslaw 2007, 109). The pyramid is 
used as a metaphor for the income distribution in society, with the top representing 
the wealthy minority and the bottom representing the population with low incomes, 
which according to Prahalad (2002) amounts to 4 billion people worldwide (for  a 
detailed discussion of Prahalad’s model and assumptions see chapter III). 
Among other goals, BoP models seek to include poor people into the formal labor 
market  (see  Karnani  2006),  and  thus  comply  with  recommendations  by  the 
International  Labor  Organization  (ILO)  according  to  which  “creating  decent 
employment opportunities is the best way to take people out of poverty” (ILO 2009, 
www).  In  many  cases,  BoP  business  models  also  have  a  strong  micro-finance 
component,  in particular with the aim of supporting poor people in their efforts to 
develop their own business, i.e. micro-enterprise, to make their way out of poverty. 
The concept of  “Microfranchising” as a form of BoP business combines precisely 
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these  two  components.  According  to  this  approach,  microentrepreneurs 
(microfranchisors), who wish to expand their well-established and profitable business 
but lack the necessary capital and managerial skills, collaborate with people willing to 
start  a  self-employment  venture  (microfranchisees).  In  a  mutually  beneficial 
partnership,  the  microfanchisor  (typically  MNCs,  NGOs  or  independent  business 
persons)  gets  the  opportunity  to  expand  his/her  business  and  at  the  same time 
provides  operational  and  ownership  opportunities  for  people  with  little  capital  or 
business experience (see Fairbourne/Gibson/Dyer 2007, 25). 
During the past years, inclusive business models have attracted increasing attention 
from corporate  leaders  as  well  as  academics.  Furthermore,  several  international 
organizations  such  as  the  World  Resources  Institute,  the  United  Nations 
Development Program and the World Business Council for Sustainable Development 
have  launched  programs  for  BoP  business  development.  However,  among 
Multilateral Development Banks, the Inter-American Development Bank is currently 
the only one with a specific department devoted exclusively to such operations. A 
detailed  discussion  of  the  IADB’s  engagement  in  BoP  transactions  will  follow  in 
chapter 4.
3. THE BOTTOM OF THE PYRAMID MODEL
“(…)  [T]he  only  way to  spur  sustainable  growth  for  the  long term is  to  define  a 
development strategy that focuses on the unmet needs in the developing world itself,  
the base of the pyramid.” (Hart 2005, 129)
3.1 Origins
Despite large scale development aid provided by public as well as private institutions 
and well-meant strategies for poverty reduction (see chapter 2), global poverty still 
prevails. In the attempt of a fresh “intellectual journey” (Prahalad 2005, xi), Prahalad 
thus rejected the mere refining of traditional approaches, such as development aid, 
subsidies,  governmental  support,  local  NGO-based  solutions  or  reliance  on 
deregulation and privatization of public goods and came up with a new idea how to 
address the problem. Together with his colleague Stuart Hart (2002), he developed 
an alternative approach to poverty reduction; one that for the first time focused on the 
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large-scale private sector  as the leading actor  in  development.  Their  strategy for 
poverty alleviation does not aim at the mobilization of large sums of development aid 
but rather on “(…) partnering with [the poor] to innovate and achieve sustainable win-
win  scenarios  where  the  poor  are  actively  engaged  and,  at  the  same time,  the  
companies providing products and services to them are profitable.” (Prahalad 2005, 
3) 
Backed  by  an  evident  need  for  action  in  combating  the  rising  inequalities  and 
disproportional benefits for the well-educated which are (among other factors) the 
result  of  the  lower  than  overall  economic  growth  at  the  bottom  of  the  income 
distribution (see Deaton 2004, 10) and increasing support from international high-
profile initiatives, such as the United Nations Global Compact, the UNDP’s Growing 
Inclusive Markets Initiative and the IADB’s Opportunities for the Majority Initiative, 
Prahalad/Hart’s concept for a leading role of the private sector in development seems 
to  find increasing  acceptance among the business community  (see Martin,  Dana 
2009). 
3.2 The Model
For the purposes of their model, Prahalad/Hart (2002) use the pyramid as symbol for 
the global income distribution. The top is represented by the wealthy minority which 
generates up to US$ 15,000 per year, while the vast majority is made up by the low-
income segment, or the “Bottom-of the-Pyramid” (BoP). When speaking of the BoP, 
Prahalad (2005) refers to the global population which lives on less than US$2 per 
day. He thus uses an income-based measure of poverty (see chapter 2.1.1) for his 
definition, which does not only include people living in extreme poverty, i.e. on less 
than  US$1  per  day  (according  to  World  Bank  definitions)  but  also  those  facing 
moderate poverty. According to his estimation, more than 4 billion people worldwide 
belong to this category (see Prahalad 2005). 
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Figure 2: The Global Economic Pyramid
Source: Hart (2005)
However,  despite  being  the  most  impoverished  and  disadvantaged  segment  of 
society,  Prahalad/Hart  (2002)  argue  that  the  BoP  can  be  a  powerful  source  of 
entrepreneurship  and  innovation  whose  potential  has  barely  been  recognized  by 
(multinational) companies. In addition, MNCs could profit from transforming the BoP 
into a new target market for their products and services. Since the BoP is currently 
largely unserved by businesses, engaging in this untapped market could represent 
an important growth opportunity for (multinational) corporations. 
The core concept  of  the BoP approach is  to  create a win-win scenario  for  both, 
companies and the poor. Directing profitable business activities at this low-income 
population and incorporating it into the formal economy is meant to result in gains for 
the companies  and,  simultaneously,  for  the  poor  who will  benefit  from enhanced 
capabilities, a higher standard of living and eventually, the overcoming of poverty. 
By placing an emphasis on the profitability of the business activity, the BoP approach 
essentially  differs  from  models  based  on  corporate  social  responsibility  or 
philanthropy. The BoP approach recognizes the potential of low-income populations 
as economic actors in the form of  customers as well  as producers,  and aims at 
businesses that  wish to  reach new markets,  in contrast  to  companies seeking to 
obtain  good  will  from  sponsorships  or  community  outreach.  Furthermore,  it 
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recognizes  people  at  the  BoP  as  innovators  in  the  market  place,  capable  of 
developing new approaches and technologies that can open new opportunities and, 
at the same time, challenge existing business practices (see IADB 2006, 6). A key 
assumption of  the BoP approach is  the increasing importance of  the low-income 
market for business growth and innovation in the future (see ibid). 
Currently,  economic activities and employment in low-income markets are largely 
dominated by the informal economy (see ILO 2002). Economic activities in this sector 
are characterized by an absence of legal regulation, with regards to taxation as well 
as labor standards and social  security.  Due to their informal nature, they are not 
considered in the determination of a country’s GDP, although it is estimated that the 
informal sector accounts for  up to 75 % of economic activity in some developing 
countries  (see  ibid).  Formalizing  this  sector  would  generate  benefits  for  the 
government  (through a  higher  tax  return),  the BoP population  (through regulated 
employment and labor standards) and businesses for which tapping into the informal 
sector can be an important opportunity for expansion and growth. 
With  the  BoP approach Prahalad  (2005)  calls  for  a  reconsideration  of  traditional 
assumptions by MNCs such that the poor should not be targeted as customers due 
to their lacking purchasing power or because they would not have a use for products 
that are typically provided to higher income markets. It is precisely because of such 
beliefs that the BoP has remained a largely underserved market. Due to the lacking 
supply of goods and services tailored to the needs of the BoP, people belonging to 
this segment often times have no other choice but to resort to offers at high costs, 
thereby incurring in the so called “poverty penalty” (Prahalad 2005, 11) or “poverty 
tax”  (Hoyt/Jamison  2007,  116).  Prahalad  associates  this  phenomenon  with  the 
perseverance of local monopolies, inadequate access, poor product distribution and 
strong  traditional  intermediaries  –  circumstances  which  he  would  like  to  see 
challenged by private-sector corporations (see Prahalad 2005, 11). He thus makes 
the  case  for  an  “inclusive  capitalism”  with  free  and  transparent  private  sector 
competition  in  the  BoP  market,  allowing  the  poor  to  actively  participate  in  the 
economy. Despite its limited purchasing power, the BoP population can still represent 
an important market for  corporations because of its size. According to Prahalad’s 
assumptions, the BoP population outnumbers the rest by almost two to one. Equally 
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important is the fact, that the majority of the BoP can be characterized as “aspiring 
poor”  (Prahalad/Hart  2002,  4).  Thanks  to  the  rapid  advance  of  modern 
communication technology and increasing media penetration even in the most rural 
parts of the Global South, the poor are increasingly aware of their misery and ever 
keener on overcoming it (see Prahalad/Hart 2002, 7). 
Moreover,  the  BoP  approach  calls  for  a  break  with  traditional  perceptions  and 
attitudes toward private and public institutions. Because of their traditionally non-for-
profit  orientation  and mandate  to  serve the common good,  public  institutions  are 
often perceived as “morally purer”  (Werhane et al.  2009,  108) than organizations 
belonging  to  the private  sector  which  are essentially  characterized by their  profit 
seeking  nature.  Arguably,  MNCs  must  be  held  accountable  for  unsustainable 
business  practices  which  in  the  past  have  sometimes  exacerbated  poverty  and 
exploitation.  Likewise,  however,  public  institutions  can  be  accused  of  inefficient 
management, misuse of (donor) funds and corruption. Since the BoP approach aims 
at a strong engagement of the private sector in the provision of social services, which 
were traditionally provided by public institutions, it is crucial for its success that the 
traditional  black-and-white thinking of  the “greedy business” and the purely social 
welfare oriented public monopoly is overcome (see Werhane et al. 2009, 108). The 
very concept of the BoP model places an emphasis on precisely the reconciliation of 
profitable business for the common social benefit. 
3.3 Business Strategies for the BoP
After  identifying  the  BoP  population,  Prahalad/Hart  (2002)  lay  out  the  business 
strategies  for  targeting  this  low-income  segment.  They  call  upon  international 
business  to  create  an  organized  market  out  of  this  largely  informal  part  of  the 
economy. To this aim, a commercial infrastructure for the BoP (see figure 3) will have 
to be established in collaboration with a number of public and private actors on the 
local, national and international level (see Prahalad/Hart 2002, 9). 
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Figure 3: Commercial Infrastructure for the BoP
Source: Prahalad/Hart (2002)
Firstly, it is necessary to create buying power among the BoP population. Half of 
the  world’s  population  lives  on  less  than  US$2  per  day  and  another  20%  face 
extreme poverty, i.e. has to survive on US$1 per day. In order to break this vicious 
cycle of poverty, Prahalad/Hart suggest two interventions:
1) Facilitation of access to credit
One way of increasing the purchasing power of the poor is to facilitate their access to 
credit  so  they  can  systematically  build  their  equity  and  develop  into  a  stable 
consumer market. Since the poor are usually associated with a higher credit risk and 
yet are not in the possession of collateral, it is nearly impossible for them to receive 
credit within the traditional banking system. Consequently, they often resort to local 
moneylenders who charge exorbitant interest rates10 on the sums provided, making it 
impossible  for  the  poor  to  break  out  of  poverty  (see  Prahalad/Hart  2002,  10). 
Essentially in response to this reality, the Grameen Bank of Bangladesh, founded by 
10  In Mumbai, India, for example, local money lenders charge interest rates of up to 20% per day. (see 
Prahalad/Hart 2002, 10)
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Nobel  Prize winner  Muhammad Yunus in  1983,  launched a micro-credit  program 
which  later  revolutionized  approaches  to  poverty  reduction  and  development.  By 
lending to small groups of women, the bank substituted physical collateral with local 
knowledge and peer pressure, which has proven even more effective as mitigation of 
credit risk. Grameen Bank is proud of its 99% repayment rate (see Yunus 1998). The 
access  to  micro-credit  has  not  only  empowered  poor  Bangladeshi  women  and 
enabled them to start their own micro-enterprise, but also led to a substantial creation 
of employment and positive transformation of the overall  standard of living at the 
village level (see Prahalad/Hart 2002, 11). In recognition of this successful approach 
to poverty  alleviation, numerous multilateral  institutions from the UN to the World 
Bank, national development agencies as well as commercial banks have engaged in 
the micro-lending business throughout virtually all countries of the Global South.
2) Creation of opportunities for income generation
In addition to  the employment opportunities created through the establishment  of 
micro-enterprises, Prahalad/Hart (2002) argue that MNCs can be important drivers of 
employment  generation.  By sourcing raw materials  based on sustainable  criteria, 
MNCs such as Nestle or Starbucks can create employment with stable income under 
conditions complying with international labor standards for hundreds and thousands 
of small producers in the Global South.
A  second  priority  for  MNCs  engaging  in  BoP  business  activities  should  be  the 
shaping of aspirations of the poor. Thanks to increasing media penetration and 
ever more widespread use of modern communication technologies and the internet, 
poor people have better access to information, but may also run the risk of adopting 
a  distorted  view  of  the  world.  Television  and  commercials  might  thus  trigger 
aspirations  among  the  poor  to  achieve  a  lifestyle  associated  with  the  affluent 
societies  in  the  Global  North.  However,  a  replication  of  the  contemporary 
consumption patterns of today’s richest nations will not be physically possible given 
the limited natural resources of our planet (see Prahalad/Hart 2002, 13). Consumers 
at the BoP must thus be educated to form aspirations that are compatible with the 
concept  of  sustainable  development,  which  by  definition  of  the  UN’s  Brundtland 
Commission  (1987)  refers  to  “(…)meeting  the  needs  of  the  present  without  
compromising  the  ability  of  future  generations  to  meet  their  own  needs.”  Such 
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consumer education can be provided in entertaining, yet informative ways through 
the media or through novel channels, such as sales people who are members of the 
BoP themselves (see Prahalad/Hart  2002, 13).  Thereby new sustainable ways of 
living can be promoted for the low-income population segments, without repeating 
the environmental mistakes of the Global North. 
Unsustainable business practices during the past decades led to a concentration of 
power and resources in the hands of a small elite and a growing gap between the 
rich and the poor. If MNCs truly want to bring about change and shape a sustainable 
future for all, they must strive to create healthy markets which foster local solutions 
and generate wealth for the masses at the BoP (see Prahalad/Hart 2002, 18). Key to 
this objective is the development of products and technologies tailored to the specific 
needs of  this  population segment.  Hindustan Lever  Limited (HLL)  has been very 
successful in reaching the BoP in India with single serve packages of detergent (see 
chapter  II.4).  For  the  development  of  such  solutions,  consideration  of  local 
knowledge is critical: “T]o be effective, strategies for the bottom must originate from 
the  bottom  of  the  pyramid”(Prahalad/Hart  2002,  19).  Bottom-up  Innovation is 
therefore essential for success. 
The fourth element in the commercial infrastructure for the BoP is improved access 
for the poor to distribution and communication systems. In many countries of the 
Global  South,  poverty  is  especially  prevalent  in  rural  areas.  Due  to  lacking 
infrastructure  people  living  in  those  areas  neither  have  access  to  products  and 
services  offered  by  (multinational)  companies,  nor  do  they  have  the  possibility 
actively participate in the market themselves by selling their own produce to a larger 
number of clients (see Prahalad/Hart 2002, 15). To be successful, MNCs therefore 
need  to  develop  effective  distribution  systems which  reach  the  BoP even  in  the 
remotest areas and facilitate their market access. The use of modern communication 
technologies such as mobile phones and the internet can be key to this endeavor as 
reflected by the example of Celtel and Celpay in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(see chapter 3.4 b)).
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3.4 Examples 
Since its launch in the early 2000s, Prahalad/Hart’s novel approach to business led 
poverty  alleviation  has  captured  increasing  interest  by  a  growing  number  of 
development institutions.  The Dutch Development Agency has partnered with the 
World Business Council for Sustainable Development to implement projects targeted 
to the Base of the Pyramid. The United States Agency for International Development 
and the Canadian Development Agency have also expressed their  interest in the 
BoP concept (see IADB 2006, 2f). In 2006, UNDP launched its “Growing Inclusive 
Markets” initiative with the aim to share best practices regarding BoP business cases 
worldwide. The World Bank has also become active in the BoP area, mostly through 
its private sector organization, the IFC, which runs a special “Grassroots Business 
Initiative” to develop small  businesses in the BOP (see ibid).  Among the regional 
Multilateral  Development Banks,  the IADB currently seems to place the strongest 
emphasis on promoting the BoP approach. In 2007, it launched the “Opportunities for 
the Majority” (OMJ) initiative (see chapter 4.7), which exclusively funds private sector 
BoP business ventures, as one of the core strategies for the term 2007-2011 and 
created an own department for these operations within its Private Sector Department. 
However, other regional MDBs, and the IFC in particular, have also demonstrated 
growing interest in supporting BoP transactions (see Martin, Dana 2009). Thanks to 
this  increasing  popularity,  more  and  more  “model  cases”  for  successful  BoP 
transactions  are  put  in  place.  In  the  following  section,  I  will  present  two  such 
examples for a better illustration of this approach.
a) Hindustan Lever Limited (HLL): Success through “single servings”
Hindustan Lever Limited (HLL) is the Indian subsidiary of  the multinational  food 
company Unilever. Its product line includes food, beverages, personal items and 
detergents. During the 1940s until  the 1980s, when India’s economy was strictly 
regulated  and  closed  to  foreign  investment,  HLL  particularly  focused  on  the 
domestic urban market and evolved as market leader in several product categories, 
notably soaps and detergents (see Rangan/Sehgal/Rajan 2007, 144). In the 1990s, 
however, the Indian economy increasingly opened up and restrictions on imports as 
well as foreign investment were eased. GDP grew at about 6 % annually and was 
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expected  to  continue  at  such  pace  in  light  of  the  increasing  global  economic 
integration. These projections promised the development of a sizable middle- and 
lower income market, especially concentrated in rural  India (see ibid).  As urban 
markets  were  increasingly  penetrated  by  foreign  competitors,  some local  firms, 
such as the detergent  manufacturer Nirma,  developed a growing interest  in the 
rural low-income market. Nirma introduced a new business model including a new 
product  formulation,  low-cost  manufacturing  process,  wide  distribution  network; 
small  packaging for daily purchasing at a lower price (see Prahalad/Hart 2002). 
HLL’s  top management  quickly  responded to  Nirma’s growing competition,  also 
recognizing the potential for future growth and expansion at the BoP despite its 
evident lack of infrastructure, low literacy levels as well as rudimentary commercial 
infrastructure and poor reach of electronic media. It  developed a new detergent 
brand called “Wheel” with a much lower of water-to-oil-ratio in the product which 
was especially targeted to the BoP population who often washes their clothes in 
rivers and other public water systems. Nirma’s business was challenged by HLL 
decentralizing its production, marketing and sales process and revision of the entire 
cost structure of its detergent business which allowed the introduction of “Wheel” at 
a  low-cost  and  single-serve  basis.  Prahalad  (2005)  finds  that  single-serve 
packaging is ideal for the BoP as it is the best marketing response to unpredictable 
income streams of the poor. While the rich are able to afford purchases in larger 
quantities, the poor tend to buy only when they have cash available and are shop 
only what they need for the day. This is why according to the author “(…) the basic 
economics of the BoP market are based on small unit packages, low margin per  
unit, high volume, and high return on capital employed.” (Prahalad 2005, 24) This 
represents a stark contrast to business economics of up-scale markets which are 
characterized by large unit packs and a high margin per unit. Managers must thus 
realize that the economics of the BoP can still be very profitable, if yet uncommon 
(see ibid). The market size is key. While rural India itself represents a huge BoP 
market which contributed substantially to HLL’s annual growth rates of 25% (see 
Prahalad/Hart  2002),  Unilever  leveraged its  multinational  corporate  presence to 
take the business model from India to BoP markets in Brazil, Indonesia and China, 
increasing its returns and at the same time, expanding opportunities for millions of 
poor people by providing quality products to meet their basic needs.
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b) Celtel and Celpay: ICT solutions for post-war Congo
Celtel International is a subsidiary of the Kuwait-based leading pan-African mobile 
telecom  company  MTC.  It  launched  operations  in  the  Democratic  Republic  of 
Congo (DRC) in 2000, during highly difficult circumstances related to the ongoing 
civil  war.  Despite  enormous  challenges  regarding  the  uncertain  political  and 
regulatory environment, the lack of security and infrastructure, widespread poverty 
and illiteracy and absence of a country-wide banking network, Celtel realized the 
promising  potential  for  BoP  business  in  the  DCR,  which  is  one  of  the  fastest 
growing African economies (see de Catheu 2007, 4). The company understood that 
telecommunications  could  help  building  up  the  lacking  infrastructure,  which  is 
particularly important for the rural poor engaging in subsistence agriculture (which 
accounted for 49% of GDP in 2006) and informal activities (see de Catheu 2007, 6). 
Furthermore,  telecom services can play an important role in the reunification of 
separated families and communities and in accessing information related to health, 
education and business. Celtel’s business model essentially focuses on the selling 
of cheap (second hand-) handsets operated with pre-paid cards of a value from 
US$3 to US$50 to  low-income populations. The use of shared handsets,  either 
within a family or through a small community business led by a local woman, is 
especially encouraged (see ibid). With this innovative approach, Celtel has gained 
two  million  customers  during  2000-2006  and  expects  further  growth  through 
intensive  upscaling  in  DRC  and  neighboring  countries.  By  2010,  the  company 
intends  to  serve  10  million  customers.  Due  to  the  low  penetration  of  landlines 
(10.000 for a population of approx. 55 million in 2002) and mobile phones (10.000 
users) at the time of Celtel’s entry into the Congolese market (see de Catheu 2002, 
8), the company’s revenues per customer in DCR significantly exceed the ones in 
more developed markets (see ibid). In addition to the provision of traditional mobile 
telecommunication services, Celtel established a subsidiary, Celpay, the first phone 
banking  operator  in  DRC (ibid).  Customers  can manage their  bank account  by 
mobile phone and/or the internet and money transfers as well as payments (e.g. for 
pre-paid phone minutes) can be made via encrypted SMS. Given the absence of a 
sound banking system in DRC, Celpay fulfils an important role as provider of such 
services in a non-traditional way. In 2006, the number of accounts managed by the 
company was 20.000 (see ibid). Since mobile banking and phone banking are inter-
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operable; they generate economies of scale and the client base of one activity can 
be leveraged for the other, promising further growth opportunities in the country and 
the region where capital investment and large scale job creation at the BoP are 
urgently needed. 
3.5 Points of critique
With the introduction of the BoP Model by Prahalad/Hart did not only come praise but 
also much criticism by academics, business leaders and civil society representatives. 
In the following chapter, I will try to provide a summary of the most important points 
of critique on the Bottom of the Pyramid model.
a) Narrow definition of poverty and development 
A fundamental weakness of Prahalad/Hart’s model is their one-dimensional 
definition of poverty, which is exclusively based on personal monetary income. 
It  thereby  promotes  to  a  normative  understanding  of  poverty  as  a  purely 
economic  problem (see  Werhane et  al.  2009,  47).  However,  as  has been 
discussed in substantial detail in chapter I, most scholars nowadays concur 
that poverty cannot be defined solely in economic terms. Quality of life and 
real  opportunities  of  people  are  influenced  by  many  more  variables  than 
income  (see  Sen,  1999).  However,  since  the  BoP  model  defines  poverty 
exclusively on the basis of a person’s purchasing power, it neglects all other 
potential aspects of poverty and is by definition unable to directly contribute to 
their  amelioration.  “The BoP proposition  focuses on  companies,  marketing 
and prosperity; it sees the social, cultural, and political benefits at best as by-
products of  economic gains.”  (Karnani  2007,  106) Thereby the BoP model 
does not encompass all degrees of poverty and essentially fails to address its 
root causes and the structures which keep people poor (see Boyle/Boguslaw 
2007, 113). Instead of a narrow focus on the provision of goods or creation of 
jobs for the BoP population on the individual firm level, critics therefore rather 
propose a more holistic, systemic and better coordinated approach to poverty 
reduction, including wealth and opportunity (see ibid). 
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b) Over-estimation of the BOP market size 
Prahalad/Hart (2002) claim that the potential market size for the Bottom of the 
Pyramid  segment  amounts  to  USD 13  trillion  PPP.  Critics,  however,  have 
raised serious doubts about this calculation, finding it “grossly over-estimated” 
(Karnani 2007, 91) and wrong. According to them, Prahalad overestimates not 
only  the  size  of  the  BoP population  but  also  its  purchasing  power.  While 
Prahalad based his BoP model on a population of 4 billion in this segment, 
researchers at the World Bank estimated the number of people living on less 
than  2  $/day  at  only  2.7  billion  in  2001  (see  ibid).  Moreover,  Prahalad’s 
calculations do not account for the fact that the poor do not spend their entire 
budget every day, but that their average daily consumption is much lower, at 
1.25 $ (see ibid). Applying these numbers, the potential  market size at the 
BoP  amounts  to  US$  1.2  trillion  PPP  (in  2002),  a  fraction  of  Prahalad’s 
assumption. Moreover, critics, such as Karnani (2007) have pointed out that 
multi-national companies based in rich countries usually repatriate profits from 
developing countries not at PPP rates, but rather at financial market exchange 
rates. Taking this into account, the global BOP market size shrinks to less 
than  US$  0.3  trillion  (see  Karnani  2007,  91).  An  additional  challenge  to 
Prahalad’s argument about the “fortune at the BoP” are the high marketing 
costs involved with doing business in areas lacking infrastructure and/or safety 
regulations, which may reduce potential profits for MNCs even more.
c) MNCs are not suitable for BOP business
Multinational corporations are the principal actors in poverty alleviation in the 
BoP  approach  according  to  Prahalad/Hart  (2005).  However,  critics  have 
pointed out  that  these organizations are not  in  the position to  successfully 
reduce global poverty, either due to institutional constraints or because of a 
mere lack of commitment. 
The perhaps most important incompatibility between strategies for business 
and large-scale social investments, such as poverty alleviation is the required 
time  frame.  While  efforts  to  reduce  poverty  require  strategic  long-term 
investment,  “[c]orporations, pressed for measurement and outcome reports,  
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find  broadly  framed investments  in  poverty  reduction  do  not  fit  neatly  into 
business  strategies  focused  on  short-term  cost-benefit  analyses” 
(Boyle/Boguslaw 2007, 103). In many cases, “current market liberal business 
realities continue to elevate company shareholders [and their interests] over  
all other stakeholders” (McFalls 2007, 90). The notion remains that the only 
social responsibility of business is to increase profits. McFalls examined in her 
research on BoP business that there exists a “general lack of commitment in 
pursuing pro-poor projects that may not yield quick returns for shareholders;  
the  propensity  to  minimize  not  only  resources,  but  also  time  dedicated  to  
pursuing the public good that inclusive capitalism may offer; and the pressure 
to withhold social learning in order to find a profit in intellectual property” (ibid). 
In that way, MNCs might actually contribute more to the problem of poverty 
than  to  its  solution.  It  is  possible  that  MNCs  establish  entry  barriers  and 
monopolistic market structures which drive smaller entrepreneurs out of the 
market,  diminish  gains  in  consumer  welfare  and  threaten  local  jobs  and 
incomes (see Warnholz 2007, 4). Some scholars even argue that despite the 
lack of goods and services provided to the BoP by international companies, 
this sector is not actually underserved. Instead, local small and medium-sized 
enterprises as well as a thriving informal sector has catered to the needs of 
this population and arguably, might be in a better position to do so given their 
profound knowledge about the local culture and context (see Warnholz 2007, 
6;  Boyle/Boguslaw  2007).  Werhane  et  al.  (2009,  107)  also  observes  that 
MNEs often lack the knowledge, access, relationships and other resources 
necessary to play a significant role in poverty reduction, unless they partner 
with a public or other noncommercial organization with proven experience in 
the  field.  Jaiswal  (2007,  96)  thus  concludes  that  MNCs  probably  have  a 
reason for not yet having invested in the BoP. Local small and medium sized 
enterprises seem to have a competitive advantage over MNCs in serving the 
BoP and in fact, have been doing it for decades. Given that local SMEs and 
micro-enterprises are closer to the people on the ground, they are easier to 
hold accountable for potential harms caused to the society or the environment 
and they may also be in a better position to contribute to a more participatory, 
people-centered development, which for the top-down management practices 
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inherent in large global corporations seems nearly impossible (see McFalls 
2007). 
d) Exploitation of the poor 
Another key point of critique at the BoP concept is the notion of it implying an 
unethical  exploitation  of  the  poor,  which  instead  of  bettering  their  living 
conditions results in the complete opposite to the sole benefit of MNCs based 
in the Global North. 
The underlying idea of the BoP concept is to raise the standard of living of the 
poor  by increasing the consumption choices available to them through the 
provision of  goods and services especially targeted to them (see Prahalad 
2005).  However,  although economic theory associates a wider  choice with 
higher levels of welfare, Karnani (2007, 97) states that  “(…) this increase in 
choice is unlikely to result  in a significant change in [the] poverty situation 
[since] a poor person is far more constrained by lack of income than by lack of  
variety of goods and services offered in the market.” The critic further argues 
that a BoP endeavor might even have the opposite of its desired effect and 
worsen the situation for  the poor if  it  encourages them to spend their  little 
money unwisely on luxury goods instead of investing in health or education 
(see  ibid).  Prahalad  rejects  such  thoughts  as  patronizing  and  arrogant, 
complying with core liberal market ideology according to which the consumers 
themselves  know  best  how  to  maximize  their  utility  (see  ibid).  Reality  is 
different  from  theory,  however,  and  it  is  a  fact  that  in  many  cases,  the 
population at the Bottom of the Pyramid lacks education as well as sufficient 
information about certain products and services, making it an easy target for 
exploitative business activity. Empirical data has shown that the poor do not 
spend their entire budget on nutrition, health and education as would be in 
their  best  interest  in  the  long  term,  but  they  rather  spend  considerable 
amounts on intoxicants and entertainment (see Banerjee/Duflo 2007). Such 
behavior  clearly  proves  Prahalad’s  neoliberal  assumption  of  the  rational 
perfectly informed consumer wrong. Like richer consumers, people at the BoP 
lack self-control, yield to temptation and spend to keep up with their neighbors 
(see  Banerjee/Duflo  2007).  However,  since  the  consequences  of  unwise 
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choices are more severe for the poor than for the rich (ibid), public action in 
the  field  of  poverty  reduction  may  seem  rather  justified  than  patronizing. 
Unilever’s efforts to sell facial whitening cream in small packages to women at 
the BoP in India clearly resulted in financial gains for the company; the welfare 
benefits for society are not so obvious however. In India, fair skin is associated 
with a higher social status and more economic possibilities, asserting certain 
inferiority to people with darker skin. By using controversial advertisements for 
its whitening cream, Unilever not only contributed to the prevalence of such 
prejudices but also took advantage of poor women’s aspirations to market a 
product whose benefits are not even scientifically proven (see Karnani 2007a, 
1353). As shown by this case, defining the BoP as a profitable market may 
entice  MNCs to  implement  unethical  marketing  strategies  for  luxury  goods 
which do not necessarily enhance the wellbeing of the poor but rather lead to 
a misplacing of their priorities and unwise allocation of their scarce resources 
(see Jaiswal 2007, 17).  However,  “the problem with the consumer-focused 
BOP approach is that it does not differentiate between priority and non-priority  
areas”  (Jaiswal 2007, 17) Thus, it  also happens that the BoP population is 
fatally  excluded  from marketing  activities  for  certain  products  which  would 
enhance their welfare, such as medicines (ibid). In this context, McFalls (2007) 
points out the imperative to resolve normative issues concerning intellectual 
property rights in the BoP model discourse.
A more fundamental  point  of  critique at  Prahalad/Hart’s  BoP model  is  has 
been  raised  by  Karnani  (2007)  who  claims  that  the  only  way  to  alleviate 
poverty is to raise the real income of the poor, either by reducing the cost of 
the products sold to them or by raising their incomes. A cost reduction can be 
achieved either by a reduction of profits or costs of production. Although the 
BoP is sometimes characterized by inefficient monopolistic market structures, 
Karnani (2007) finds that this is rather the exception. He therefore concludes 
that the only way to reduce product prices is by cutting the costs of production. 
This often implies lowering the quality of the product offered (see ibid). Unlike 
Prahalad (2005) who insists on the delivery of  high-quality products to the 
BoP,  disregarding  the  provision  of  low-quality  products  to  the  poor  as 
disrespectful and potentially dangerous (see ibid), Karnani (2007, 102) claims 
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that “selling inexpensive, low-quality products does not hurt the poor (as long 
as  they  understand  [the]  tradeoffs  related  to  safety)”  because  their 
understanding of quality is relatively lower than it is for the rich. 
Much critique has also been raised about the nature of inclusion of the poor in 
the economy which the BoP model  promotes.  As Prahalad/Hart   (2002,  8) 
write: “The primary task is to create a consumer market out of the poor (…)” 
However,  simply providing a larger offer of goods and services to the BoP 
population, does not necessarily improve their standard of living if their income 
level remains the same (see Karnani 2007). Furthermore, the perception of 
the  poor  as  passive  participants  in  the  (global)  economy  warrants  some 
criticism from an ethical point of view. Such an approach strongly suggests a 
top-down  implementation  of  policies  for  poverty  reduction  rather  than  a 
participatory people-centered development which allows the poor to play their 
part in the improvement of their own fate (see McFalls 2007, 92). Alternative 
propositions for the BoP model thus pledge for an inclusion of the poor not 
only as consumers,  but most  importantly as producers (see Karnani  2007, 
102).  Microcredit  may  offer  a  promising  solution  for  small  and  micro-
entrepreneurs at the BoP; however, critics doubt the long term viability of such 
businesses, since  “(…) the vast majority of microcredit clients are caught in  
subsistence  activities  with  no  prospect  of  competitive  advantage”  (Karnani 
2007, 104). This situation can be changed if effective mechanisms are created 
which  allow the  poor  to  access powerful  markets  with  their  products  (see 
Jaiswal  2007,  20),  generating  sufficient  profits  and  allowing  the 
microenterprise to  grow and expand its  reach to  a  larger  number of  small 
producers. Ideally organized in the form of cooperatives, the positive impact of 
such  businesses  can  be  significant  on  the  lives  of  the  poor  (see  ibid). 
Nonetheless, some still argue that a better way for eradicating poverty is by 
creating  opportunities  for  steady  decent  employment  (see  ibid).  Although 
microcredit and micro-entrepreneurship have certainly produced some positive 
effects on the improvement of  living conditions of  poor people (see Yunus 
1999),  the  majority  of  new  jobs  created  must  be  attributed  to  small  and 
medium sized enterprises, not micro-entrepreneurs (see Karnani 2007, 106). 
Thus, the role of government is essential in the implementation of appropriate 
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policies which facilitate the creation and growth of  private enterprises (see 
ibid). 
e) Detracting from the imperative to correct government failures 
With  its  heavy emphasis  on private sector  led development strategies,  the 
BoP  model  as  designed  by  Prahalad/Hart  (2002)  avoids  any  strong 
government intervention in the field of  poverty reduction. It  thereby fails  to 
acknowledge the important role of governments in the creation of a favorable 
business climate which is a prerequisite for successful BoP business activities. 
Appropriate economic policies, basic infrastructure and functioning institutions 
form the necessary framework for private sector activities which must be set 
by the government (see Karnani 2007, 106). However, Prahalad/Hart’s theory 
clearly de-emphasizes the role of the state as provider of basic services and 
infrastructure (see Karnani 2007, 108). By arguing that goods and services 
can  be  more  efficiently  provided  by  private  firms,  they  detract  from  the 
government’s obligation to provide public goods, such as infrastructure (i.e. 
roads and ports), health and education systems, stripping it of one of its core 
functions.  In  the  case  of  the  Mexican  city  of  Reynosa,  for  example,  the 
municipality  contracted  the  multinational  cement  manufacturer  CEMEX  to 
pave  roads  in  low-income  neighborhoods,  instead  of  providing  the  works 
directly  via  government-run  companies  (see  OMJ  2009,  www).  Somewhat 
controversially, the affected BoP population was even required to contribute to 
the cost of the street paving with resources they evidently did not possess and 
had  to  take  out  microloans  for  (see  ibid).  A  similar  model  has  been 
implemented regarding the access to natural gas pipelines for households in 
the low-income neighborhoods of Buenos Aires (see Fundacion Pro Vivienda 
Social 2009, www). 
Despite the largely successful delivery of services in the examples mentioned, 
critics  still  request  that,  “[p]rivatization  should  be  treated  as  a  means  of  
increasing efficiency and not as a way of reducing or undermining the role of  
the state.” (von Weizsaecker et al. 2005, 360). Especially governments in the 
Global  South  often  lack  the  political  power  and  experience  to  effectively 
negotiate  with  multinational  corporations,  which  can  eventually  lead  to 
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inadequate regulations for investments and a concentration of power in the 
hands of a few powerful enterprises (see ibid). “Companies often use political  
connections, pressure or bribery to secure regulatory decisions to their liking.  
In extreme cases, they can threaten to terminate supply contracts altogether,  
a strategy that is tantamount to blackmail” (see ibid) Not uncommonly, MNCs 
demand a guaranteed rate of return in their contracts, thereby shifting all risks 
related  to  currency  and  demand  to  the  often  ill-prepared  government. 
Moreover, “[p]rivatization can divide [especially unequal] societies into ‘haves’  
and ‘have nots’,  with  large  differences in  the  access to,  or  quality  of,  the  
services (e.g. education, police protection, and clean drinking water, electricity  
and recreation facilities)  available  to  the two groups.  In  many cases,  after  
privatization the poor have to spend a much higher proportion of their income 
to satisfy such ‘basic needs’” (ibid, 355). Privatization can also be problematic 
regarding  democratic  practices  and  common  public  ownership  of  goods. 
Notably in countries in the Global South, where public services are perceived 
as part of a process of democratic nation-building (see von Weizsaecker et al., 
357),  state supervision of  privatized utilities,  esp.  when provided by MNCs 
whose  decision-making  processes  are  rarely  transparent  for  the  local 
population,  often  appear  rather  abstract  and  do  not  allow  for  democratic 
participation  (ibid).  Since  eventually,  such  practices  might  lead  to  less 
democratic participation and alienation from government (see ibid), critics of 
privatization  have  argued  that  instead  of  replacing  the  public  provision  of 
goods by privatization, government failures should be identified and corrected 
through civil society action from the bottom-up (see Karnani 2007, 108). 
f) Scope of activities and targeting of LLDCs insufficient
Critics have raised substantial doubts about the potential of the BoP model to 
really contribute to the eradication of extreme poverty. As Jaiswal (2007, 4) 
argues, “[p]eople’s basic needs must be fulfilled before anyone can look at  
them as profitable  BOP markets”.  This  clearly  excludes populations of  the 
world’s poorest countries (or Least Developed Countries, LLDCs) where most 
of the people live on less than US$ 1 per day, who would be in greatest need 
of any poverty reduction efforts. Furthermore, a number of additional factors, 
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e.g. inefficient regulation, widespread corruption, lack of basic infrastructure 
and  weak  financial  and  banking  systems  may  discourage  MNCs  to  do 
business in LLDCs. However, since the world’s population living in extreme 
poverty amounts to more than one billion (see World Bank 2006 in Jaiswal 
2007), Prahalad/Hart’s approach would be limited to the remaining three of the 
suggested four billion at the Bottom of the Pyramid, i.e. the people living in 
moderate poverty (on less than US$ 2 per day but more than US$ 1 per day) 
which are largely concentrated on Middle Income Countries, such as Brazil, 
India and Mexico. Indeed, most of the successful BoP business cases were 
observed in  these countries,  supporting the assumption that  private  sector 
involvement can only be viable and fruitful once a certain level of economic 
development  has  been attained (see Jaiswal  2007,  5).  This  reality  is  also 
observed  by  Boyle/Boguslaw  (2007,  106)  who  find  that  “(…)  business 
involvement and leadership is of greatest importance with regard to moderate  
and relative poverty reduction (…)”. However, if the approach is indeed only 
feasible in Middle Income Countries, i.e. limited to the alleviation of moderate 
poverty,  its  merits  for  contributing  to  the  achievement  of  the  MDGs  and 
especially the eradication of extreme poverty must be subject to question. 
g) Lack of   a macroeconomic analysis 
Another  weakness  of  Prahalad’s  theory  is  its  lack  of  a  macroeconomic 
analysis. Although the concept intentionally places a stronger emphasis on a 
micro-oriented approach (see Prahalad 2005, xi) , a discussion of implications 
for  macro-variables  would  have  been  important  to  complete  the  picture. 
Prahalad’s  theory  goes  barely  beyond  the  definition  of  the  BoP 
population/market size and concepts for MNCs to engage in BoP business. No 
attention whatsoever is devoted to the question which policies or institutional 
framework would be needed to encourage firms to enter the BoP space (see 
Boyer  2003,  13).  Given  that  the  legal  environment  could  be  critical  in 
addressing challenges such as high transaction costs,  the scaling of  small 
economies and the overcoming of cultural and organizational barriers to BoP 
business (see ibid), a sound academic discussion could have complemented 
Prahalad’s  theory  in  a  valuable  way.  Moreover,  suggestions  about  how 
broader alliances among BoP stakeholders could be incentivized as well as a 
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discussion  about  the  influence of  geopolitics  on  BoP activities  would  have 
been of interest (see ibid). Even more important from a macro point of view are 
questions  about  the  potential  for  BoP  business  to  induce  global  systemic 
change and the possible effects of new ideas from the bottom up on traditional 
industry  structures  (see ibid).  However,  Prahalad has not  taken up any of 
these questions and essentially fails to include a macro-perspective into his 
theories.
3.6 Interim Results
After explaining the BoP model with its origins and theory and summarizing the most 
important points of critique at the concept, I will now, at the end of the theoretical part 
of  this  thesis,  revisit  the  respective research hypotheses of  chapter  1  and try  to 
verify/falsify them.
 The BoP approach represents a novel strategy for poverty reduction and can 
be  clearly  differentiated  from  traditional  public  or  private  sector  led 
approaches.
Prahalad’s theory is clearly different from poverty reduction strategies based on the 
provision of development aid, be it by the public (through bi- or multilateral aid) or the 
private  sector  (through corporate  philanthropy or  CSR).  While  the idea of  selling 
products to low-income individuals for profit is not necessarily novel (as it has been 
common practice for many local SMEs in the Global South), it is new in the context of 
a poverty reduction strategy. Moreover, the emphasis on MNEs as implementers of 
BoP business represents an innovation. This offers the advantage of reaching a large 
number of poor people on a global level; however, also implies many challenges for 
these organizations whose primary goals are usually not related to development.
 C.K.  Prahalad’s  BoP  model  can  be  criticized  for  a  number  of  theoretical 
weaknesses, such as a too narrow definition of poverty and development, an 
over-estimation  of  the  BoP  market  size,  insufficient  targeting  of  Least 
Developed Countries, the inadequacy of MNCs as actors in development and 
the  detraction  from  the  imperative  to  correct  government  failures  which 
altogether may eventually lead to exploitation of the poor.
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As has been shown above, critique at Prahalad’s theory of BoP business is indeed 
justified  in  many  cases.  Thus,  it  is  questionable  if  the  model  –  if  implemented 
completely  according  to  theory  –  would  yield  the  expected  positive  development 
impacts.  In  order  to  answer  this  question,  I  will,  in  following  chapter,  study  the 
practical implementation of the BoP approach by the Inter-American Development 
Bank. Particular emphasis will be placed on its compliance with Prahalad’s theory as 
well as the consequences for poverty reduction.
4. THE INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK AND PRIVATE SECTOR LED 
POVERTY REDUCTION
4.1 History and Mission of the IADB
The  origins  of  the  Inter-American  Development  Bank  date  back  to  the  late  19th 
century, when the idea of a development bank for Latin America was first brought up 
at the First Pan-American Conference. However, the creation of this institution did 
not happen until  1959, proposed by President Juscelino Kubitschek of Brazil  and 
formally adopted by the Organization of American States (OAS). Nonetheless, the 
IADB is  not  a  OAS  organ  because  it  grants  membership  also  to  non-American 
countries that are members of the International Monetary Fund (see OAS 2009, www 
and IADB 1996, 6). (A list of the borrowing as well as the non-borrowing member 
states will be provided in paragraph 4.2). One of the main reasons for the IADB’s 
foundation was the discontent of many Latin American countries with the structures 
and practices of the Bretton Woods Institutions, the World Bank and the International 
Monetary  Fund,  and  the  attempt  to  create  an  institution  which  would  serve  the 
specific interests of those countries. Although the IADB consequently refers to its 
independence from the Bretton Woods Institutions, it is a fact that the two institutions 
maintain  a  close  relationship  in  practice,  as  do  other  multilateral  regional 
development banks and the World Bank (see AfDB 2009, www). 
According  to  its  constitution,  the  mission  of  the  Bank  is  to  “contribute  to  the 
acceleration  of  the  process  of  economic  and  social  development  of  the  regional  
developing  member  countries”  (IADB  1996,  5).  To  achieve  this  goal,  the  bank 
provides financial  assistance in the form of loans and grants as well  as technical 
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assistance  to  governments,  civil  society  organizations  and  private  enterprises  in 
countries of Latin America and the Caribbean (see IADB 2009, www). 
Together  with  the  Multilateral  Investment  Fund  (MIF)  and  the  Inter-American 
Investment Corporation (IIC), which both aim at the support of private sector entities 
and the promotion of private sector development in Latin America and the Caribbean, 
the IADB forms the IADB Group. A more detailed description of the MIF and the IIC 
will follow in section 4.6. 
4.2 The member countries of the IADB 
The IADB is owned by 48 sovereign states, which can be divided into a group of 
borrowing and non-borrowing member states (see IADB 2009, www).  
The group of borrowing member states is comprised of 26 countries, all of them in 
Latin America and the Caribbean: Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Guyana,  Haiti,  Honduras,  Jamaica,  Mexico,  Nicaragua,  Panama,  Paraguay,  Peru 
and Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela.
Collectively, the borrowing countries hold 50.02 % of the IADB’s shares and voting 
rights (see chapter 4.4 and figure 4 for details about the distribution of voting rights). 
The  remaining  22  member  countries  form  the  group  of  non-borrowing  member 
states,  all  of  them  are  non-regional:  Austria,  Belgium,  Canada,  China,  Croatia, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Portugal,  the  Republic  of  Korea,  Slovenia,  Spain,  Sweden,  Switzerland,  United 
Kingdom and the USA. 
4.3 Capitalization of the IADB
The IADB raises its funds through the issuing of bonds on the international financial 
markets. These bonds are backed by the sum of capital subscriptions paid in by the 
Bank's 47 member countries, plus the sum of callable capital subscriptions pledged 
by the Bank's 22 non-borrowing member countries.  Together these constitute the 
Bank's ordinary capital, which after the last capital increase in 1994 amounts to US$ 
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101 billion. Of this amount, 4.3 % is paid in, while the remaining 95.7 % is callable. 
The callable capital pledged by the 22 non-borrowing members, which include the 
world's wealthiest developed countries, functions as a guarantee for the bonds that 
the  IDB sells.  This  arrangement  ensures  that  the  IDB maintains  a  triple-A credit 
ranking,  and,  as  a result,  can  make loans to  its  borrowing member  countries  at 
interest rates similar to those that commercial banks charge their largest corporate 
borrowers (see, IADB 2009, www). It enjoys preferred creditor status, meaning that 
outstanding debt  payments must  be met  with  the IADB first  before serving other 
(private) lenders. During the last years, the IADB had an annual lending volume of 
approx. US$ 8 billion. Given the size of the institution, the conditions of the financial 
markets  and  the  development  progress  of  the  region,  this  amount  seemed 
appropriate. In the wake of the recent financial crisis unfolding in 2008, however, the 
Bank has faced a growing demand for finance from its Latin American and Caribbean 
borrowers. As a result, the IADB approved $11.2 billion in operations in 2008 and 
further increased its lending volume to a record of to $15.9 billion in 2009 (see IADB 
2009, www). In light of these events, the IADB is currently in the process of its ninth 
general  capital  increase.  The governors  of  the  IADB have agreed to  provide  an 
additional US$ 70 billion, which effectively represents a 70% increase of the IADB’s 
current lending volume (see IADB 2010, 1). The process is expected to be completed 
with the subscription of shares of the member countries, after several critical issues 
concerning the role and specific mandate of  the Bank as well  as lending policies 
have been resolved. A public consultation with NGOs and other representatives of 
civil  society,  which is also part  of  the process, has already been held (see IADB 
2009, www).
4.4 Governance and Distribution of voting rights within the IADB
The highest authority of the IADB is the Board of Governors, which is comprised of 
the  finance  ministers  or  presidents  of  the  member  countries’  central  banks.  The 
Board  of  Governors  is  responsible  for  the  major  policy  decisions  and  strategic 
planning of the institution and meets once a year (see IADB 2009, www).
Day-to-day  business,  however,  is  carried  out  by  the  IADB’s  Board  of  Executive 
Directors which is its supreme unit of decision making, on projects as well as policy 
matters.  The  Board  consists  of  14  Executive  Directors,  each  with  an  Alternate 
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Executive  Director,  sharing  among  them  the  representation  of  all  the  member 
countries. Voting power of each Executive Director is determined by the respective 
country’s  shareholdings,  i.e.  its  subscription  to  the  IADB’s  ordinary  capital  (see 
Annex 1). The United States is the single largest non-borrowing shareholder, with 
approximately 30 percent of the voting power, followed by Japan (5%) and Canada 
(4%). The 26 Latin American and Caribbean borrowing members collectively control 
50.02 % of the IDB’s shares (with Argentina, Brazil  and Mexico being the largest 
shareholders) (see ibid).
Figure 4: Voting Power of IADB Member Countries (2010)
Source: IADB 2010, www
4.5 The IADB and Private Sector Development
Recognizing the important role of the private sector in the generation of economic 
growth, employment and investment, which are all key aspects in the development 
process  of  a  country  and  its  society,  the  IADB  in  recent  years  has  placed  an 
increasing emphasis on the promotion of private sector activities in the region. This 
strategy has been reflected in the IADB’s lending practices, which during the past two 
decades, have increasingly focused on the promotion of private sector development 
through  investment  and  policy  reform  loans  to  foster  competitiveness,  the 
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modernization of the state, financial and capital market development and small and 
medium enterprises (SMEs) (see IADB 2004, 1). With policy-based lending to the 
public sector, the Bank seeks to promote reform concerning structural  issues that 
affect  the  private  sector  in  the  LAC  region,  such  as  (see  IADB  2004,  11):  (i) 
strengthening  the  legal  and  institutional  framework  in  which  financial  systems 
operate,  (ii)  developing  financial  regulatory  agencies,  (iii)  strengthening  capital 
markets, (iv) strengthening property rights over assets (particularly the assets of the 
poor) such as land and housing, and (v) developing microfinance systems and other 
alternative institutions to  expand access to  credit.  The overarching  goal  of  these 
operations is the creation of  an enabling business environment,  which allows the 
private  sector  to  thrive  and  yet,  to  find  “(…)  a  good  balance  between  the 
complementary functions of the state and the private sector” (IADB 2004, 5).
Besides providing finance to public entities (through so called loans with sovereign 
guarantee), the IADB also lends directly to private sector organizations to meet their 
long-term financing needs (so called loans without sovereign guarantee) (see IADB 
2004,  14).  Additionally,  the  IADB  offers  fee-based  consultancy  services  to 
enterprises on matters such as restructuring, financial engineering and the search of 
joint partners (see IADB 2004, 15). The target of the IADB’s private sector activities 
are  micro-,  small-,  medium-  and large-scale  businesses  in  all  sectors.  The bank 
either lends to them directly or indirectly through local financial institutions which are 
in the position to better accommodate the needs of the client (e.g. provide funds in 
local currency) thanks to guarantees on credit or political risk offered by the IADB 
(see ibid).  Reflecting the increasing emphasis on private sector development,  the 
maximum lending volume to the private sector was augmented from a 5 % of total 
lending volume to 10% in 2001 (see IADB 2001, 1). At the 2010 annual meeting of 
the Board of Governors, the limit has once more been altered to 20% through 2012 
(see IADB 2010, 3). After this date, private sector operations will be subject to the 
IADB’s new Non-Sovereign-Guaranteed lending strategy and capital adequacy policy 
(see ibid). 
During  the  last  twenty  years,  the  IADB  Group  has  also  created  a  number  of 
specialized institutions and organizational units with the particular mission to promote 
private sector development. 
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4.5.1 Structured and Corporate Finance (SCF) Department 
The SCF Department is responsible for the IDB Group’s financing of large banks and 
private sector investments Latin America and the Caribbean.  It  also supports the 
development  of  international  trade  through  a  special  Trade  Finance  Facilitation 
program. The loans provided by SCF are “A” Loans,  i.e.  they are funded by the 
IADB’s own resources. However, SCF also collaborates with banks and institutional 
investors  to  participate  in  co-financing  through  loan  participations,  or  “B  Loans”. 
Loans granted by the SCF department are usually for the long term (i.e. 5-30 years) 
and cover for example greenfield projects, increases in production capacity, growth 
as well as refinancing of liabilities (see IADB 2009, www). An important SCF project 
approved in 2008 is, for instance, the US$ 400 million loan to support the largest 
infrastructure project currently underway in the LAC region, expansion of the Panama 
Canal (see ibid). Another project of similar importance is the US$ 200 million loan 
granted to the biggest producer of slab steel in LAC, the Gerdau Acominas steel mill 
of Brazil, for the purpose of modernization and productivity increase of two of its steel 
mills in the southeast of the country (see ibid). The IADB’s Sustainable Energy and 
Climate Change Initiative (SECCI) contributes to the project with an energy efficiency 
and carbon footprint assessment of the mill’s operations. 
Major  investment  activities  were  also  effectuated  with  public  and  private  utility 
providers, such as the Basic Sanitation Company of Sao Paolo, which provides water 
and wastewater  services to  the  26  million inhabitants  of  this  Brazilian  state,  and 
Costa Rica’s state-owned energy and telecommunications provider. 
In 2009, the approved SCF operations amounted to a total of US$ 919 million (see 
IADB 2010, 23). Projects covered 17 countries in LAC and focused on innovative 
financing  of  “green”  investments,  i.e.  financing  of  renewable  energy,  energy 
efficiency and recycling projects. Thereby, the IADB hopes to create a demonstration 
effect  for  other  investors  and  contribute  to  the  promotion  of  investments  in 
environmentally sustainability projects and industries (see ibid). 
Moreover, SCF provides partial credit and political risk guarantees and can work with 
clients  to  mobilize  non-reimbursable  resources  for  project  preparation  (see  IADB 
2009, www). 
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4.5.2 The Inter-American Investment Corporation (IIC)
The Inter-American Investment Corporation (IIC) was established by the Board of 
Governors  of  the  IADB  in  1986  with  the  purpose  to  promote  the  economic 
development in Latin America and the Caribbean by encouraging the establishment, 
expansion, and modernization of private small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) 
in supplementation to the activities of the Inter-American Development Bank (see 
IADB 2009, 2). To fulfill its mission, the IIC provides financing as well as access to 
private  and  public  domestic  and  foreign  capital  to  such  enterprises.  In  order  to 
facilitate  this  process,  the  IIC has developed a  special  tool  (called FINPYME) to 
assess the performance and financial capacity of SMEs which are often underserved 
by the banking sector (see FINPYME 2010, www) . The transfer of technology and 
technical and managerial know-how are also fostered by the institution. Additionally, 
the  IIC  seeks to  stimulate  the  development  and expansion  of  public  and private 
investment opportunities in the Latin American region. The loans granted by the IIC 
are entirely without sovereign guarantee. The initial authorized capital stock of the IIC 
was US $ 200 million. Over the years, it has been increased several times, ultimately 
in 2008, when it amounted to about US $ 700 million (see IIC 2009, 77). 
The IIC is formally independent of the IADB and has its own bodies of governance. 
However, since the IIC is part of the IADB Group and closely collaborates with the 
IADB, the member countries of the two institutions are the same (with the exception 
of a few countries that are members of the IADB but not of the IIC) and the positions 
of Governors and Executive Directors of the IIC are held by the same persons who 
represent their countries in the IADB. Furthermore, the President of the IADB is ex-
officio Chairman of the Board of  Executive Directors of the IIC. He presides over 
meetings of the Board of Executive Directors; however, he has no voting right except 
in the event of a tie. He may also participate in meetings of the Board of Governors, 
but has no right to vote whatsoever (see IIC 2010, 59). The distribution of voting 
rights of the IIC is similar to the IADB’s (see ibid). 
Unlike the private sector windows of the IADB, the IIC is legally enabled to provide 
capital to private sector borrowers in the function of a shareholder. It can do so even 
in cases where public institutions are also shareholders. Although it cannot intervene 
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in the management, it is represented in the general assembly. Later, it can sell its 
quota.
In 2009, the IIC approved 40 projects amounting to US$ 299 million in direct loans 
and investments and an additional US$ 342 million in co-financing operations (see 
IIC 2010, 42). The IIC’s investment portfolio in 2009 consisted of 203 projects with a 
total amount of loans outstanding of US$ 889.8 million (see ibid, 36). The majority of 
investments (63%) last year were made in the financial service sector and about 12% 
in agriculture and agribusiness (see ibid). Other investment projects were distributed 
among various industries, from general manufacturing, oil  and mining to food and 
beverages (see ibid). The 2009 investment activity by the region reflects the regional 
distribution of the IIC’s total investment portfolio, with 20-35% of projects in each the 
Southern Cone, Andean and Central American (including Mexico) region. Regional 
and Caribbean projects account only for a minor proportion of investment activity (up 
to 10%) (see ibid). 
4.5.3 The Multilateral Investment Fund (MIF)
The  Multilateral  Investment  Fund  (MIF)  is  a  US$  1.3  billion-dollar  grant  and 
investment facility administered by the Inter-American Development Bank. The MIF 
complements the private-sector development activities of the IADB and the IIC, but 
has a distinct function within the IADB Group. Its projects promote innovation, testing 
new  approaches  to  strengthen  competitiveness,  demonstrate  possibilities  to 
commercial  markets,  and  advance  difficult  reform  issues.  Another  focus  of  MIF 
activities is the promotion of joint investments (such as public-private-partnerships) 
with local partners in the project country (see MIF 2010, www). The idea is that the 
MIF  then  leverages  its  impact  by  sharing  the  results  of  its  experience  so  that 
successful  approaches  can  be  replicated  (see  IADB,  2005).  The  MIF’s  general 
mandate is to encourage policy reforms toward an improvement of the investment 
climate  for  the  domestic  and  foreign  private  sector  in  Latin  America  and  the 
Caribbean  (see  IADB,  1992,  3).  Special  emphasis  is  placed  on  fostering  the 
development of medium and small enterprises as well as micro-entrepreneurs (see 
ibid). The operations of the Fund are managed through three facilities (see IADB, 
1992, 5ff): 
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a) The Technical Cooperation Facility
This facility  seeks to finance diagnostic studies to identify investment constraints, 
including  legislative,  financial and  regulatory  impediments  to  investment,  policy 
reform plans, advice on the design and implementation of privatization programs and 
assistance on the development of financial systems. 
b) The Human Resources Facility
This facility provides grants to government agencies and educational institutions for 
Human Resource  development  and training  necessary  for  increased finance and 
investment and an expanded private sector. 
c) The Small Enterprise Development Facility
The  aim  of  this  facility  is  to  provide  direct  or  indirect  financing  to  local  micro-
enterprises and small businesses in Latin America and the Caribbean. Thereby, their 
financial and business practices shall be improved so the businesses become self-
sustaining  and their  capabilities to  identify  business opportunities  and sources of 
financing shall be strengthened.
The MIF was initially established for a period of 10 years and the agreement of its 
establishment was renewed once until the end of 2007. However, in 2005, a MIF II 
Facility  was agreed upon by the member states of  the IADB, with essentially  the 
same mandate and use of funds (see IADB, 2005). 
In 2009, MIF operations amounted to a total of US$ 115.7 million with 114 grants and 
20 investment projects approved (see IADB 2010, 23). More than 40 % of these 
operations cover the smaller and relatively poorer C and D countries (see chapter 
4.6.5, Table 3). The projects target a wide range of sectors and beneficiaries, ranging 
from  the  implementation  of  a  sustainable  model  for  micro-insurance  in  Central 
America  to  the  facilitation  of  access to  capital  markets  for  SMEs and innovative 
programs to combat youth unemployment (see MIF 2010, www). 
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In addition, the MIF hosted a number of conferences in 2009, such as the twelfth 
Inter-American  Forum  on  Microenterprise  and  the  seventh  Inter-American 
Conference on Corporate Social Responsibility, among others.
With this brief overview of the IADB’s traditional private sector windows, my intention 
was to highlight the wide range of the Bank’s private sector activities. With its three 
private sector lending institutions, the SCF, IIC and the MIF, which all have a distinct 
focus in terms of project type (loans or grants), size and borrowers, the IADB has 
numerous  opportunities  and  tools  available  to  foster  private  sector  development 
activities  in  the  LAC  region.  While  SCF  provides  long-term  financing  to  big 
companies and banks for large-scale infrastructure or financial operations, the MIF 
lends small amounts to SMEs and micro-entrepreneurs and focuses rather on the 
fostering  of  innovation,  advocacy  and  business  development  through  non-
reimbursable investments.  The IIC, however, as a strong focus on investments in 
financial services and its formally independent status put in a better position to fulfill 
this mandate.
4.6 The Opportunities for the Majority Initiative
In what follows I will  give a detailed description of the OMJ Initiative of the Inter-
American Development Bank, its history and activities. Special attention is devoted to 
this private sector window of the IADB as the OMJ office provides advice and funds 
exclusively for private sector BoP operations in Latin America and the Caribbean. It 
can thus be regarded as a catalyst of implementation for C.K. Prahalad’s BoP model. 
Applying the theory elaborated in chapter 3, I will, at the end of this chapter, assess 
two OMJ project examples according to the points of critique raised earlier and try to 
draw a conclusion for the activities of the office and its future.
4.6.1 Background and History
When Luis Alberto Moreno took office as president of the IADB in 2005, he  “(…) 
came to the bank with a reform agenda. He was looking for a way to shake up the 
institution, (…) to revitalize it and to make it relevant to today’s Latin America (…)” 
(Martin, Dana 2009). As a consequence, he launched a comprehensive institutional 
re-alignment.  Within  this  process  of  restructuring,  the  IADB’s  non-sovereign 
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guaranteed lending was reinforced by the creation of the vice-presidency for private 
sector  additional  to  the  already existing  private  sector  lending  arms of  the  IADB 
Group,  the MIF and the IIC.  Moreover,  Moreno’s newly assumed presidency and 
institutional re-alignment coincided with the development of an innovative approach 
for  private sector  led poverty  reduction strategies in  the Base of  the Pyramid by 
academics such as C.K. Prahalad and Stuart Hart. Spurred by personal interest and 
an  institutional  strategy  to  foster  private  sector  development,  President  Moreno 
installed an interdisciplinary working group consisting of bank officials from different 
public as well as private departments to explore the opportunities and feasibility for 
this new academic approach in the context of the IADB.  “(…) [T]he question was: 
What could a MDB bring to this process to try to help the private sector enter as a  
more prominent player in development in the region?” (Martin, Dana 2009)
To answer this question and to learn about the prominent players in the BoP market 
in LAC and its characteristics, a number of studies (e.g. “The Next Four Billion” in 
cooperation  with  the World  Resources Institute)  and market  analyses of  different 
sectors in different countries were conducted. These studies proved the existence of 
a market worth US$ 500 billion and made up by 350 million people who earn less 
than US$ 300 per month in the region. Moreover, they revealed the willingness of 
these  low-income  populations  to  pay  private  sector  providers  for  the  delivery  of 
goods and services which should be provided by the government if there is a better 
value-proposition. As already mentioned in chapter 3,  due to a lack of  consumer 
options the poor are often forced to pay a “poverty penalty” or face high opportunity 
costs because of long waiting times for the delivery of public goods. 
The results of these studies were presented in a publication and conference with 
prominent speakers, such as Bill Clinton, Hernando de Soto and Luis Alberto Moreno 
and paved the way for the creation of the Opportunities for the Majority office by the 
IADB’s Board of Governors in 2006. Thereby the IADB was the first MDB to establish 
a special institutional unit  for BoP operations. Although the other members of the 
IADB Group, the MIF and the IIC, also focus on private sector operations,  neither of 
these financing  windows has an  exclusive  focus on  low-income markets  (Martin, 
Dana 2009), thus justifying the creation of OMJ to serve this need. The IADB’s Board 
of  Governors acknowledged that  the majority  of  the population in  LAC has been 
73
empowered  politically,  but  nevertheless  been  excluded  from  full  participation  in 
economic life by weak institutions, inadequate policies, boom-and-bust cycles and 
other constraints (see IADB 2006, 1). A missing link between macroeconomic growth 
and  improved  living  conditions  for  the  entire  or  majority  population  has  been 
identified and explained primarily by an insufficient economic empowerment of these 
people. Aim of the OMJ Initiative is thus to foster the entrepreneurial spirit among 
these people and develop new approaches and business models, essentially driven 
by  the  private  sector,  which  seek  to  improve  the  economic  opportunities  for  the 
majority of the population in LAC (see ibid). By establishing the OMJ Initiative, the 
IADB recognized that  traditional  development approaches,  which rely on a single 
sector  or  actor,  are  insufficient,  and  that  there  is  a  need  for  new  strategic 
partnerships between the private sector, civil society an community stakeholders are 
necessary  for  economic  development  (see  ibid).  Special  emphasis,  however,  is 
placed on “(…)  the private sector as a partner in development, to complement the 
efforts already under way by the Bank working with the public sector and to extend 
its support of private sector actions that embrace the majority” (IADB 2007, 2).  It is 
expected that “(…) financial partnerships with the Bank will allow [private firms] to  
deepen their involvement, particularly focusing on the incorporation of [the BoP] into  
the economic mainstream, creating a virtuous circle of development and business 
prosperity” (ibid). 
4.6.2 The Majority
“The Majority”, i.e. the target of the IADB’s OMJ Initiative has been defined as the 
population generating annual earnings of approximately US$3,260 or less, which in 
the region of Latin America and the Caribbean comprises 360 million people or 70 % 
of the total population (see IADB 2006: 1). This figure includes the roughly 25% of 
Latin America’s 512 million people living on less than US$ 2 per day (see World Bank 
2007,  www)  as  well  as  low-income  consumer  segments  and  thus,  essentially 
represents  the  population  at  the  “Bottom-of-the-Pyramid”  according  to  C.K. 
Prahalad’s theory (see chapter 3). When compared to other regions in the Global 
South, such as South Asia or Sub-Saharan Africa, it is evident that the majority of 
countries in Latin America and the Caribbean classify as Middle Income Countries 
(i.e.  generating a GNI  p.c.  of  US$ 976 to  US$ 11,905 according to  World  Bank 
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definitions) where a relatively large part of the population belongs to the middle-class 
consumer segment. These people are poor, yet not destitute and therefore account 
for a significant share of spending in the region (see D’Andrea/Herrero 2006, 26). 
This fact seems to attract significant private sector interest and thus characterizes the 
LAC region as a particularly attractive place for BoP transactions. 
4.6.3 Activities
The OMJ Initiative reflects  a  new strategy for  the IADB, shifting from a primarily 
macroeconomic approach to poverty reduction to a microeconomic focus (see IADB 
2006, 1). With this microeconomic emphasis, the IADB seeks to improve the living 
conditions  of  the  majority  population  through  specifically  targeted  small-scale 
investments  in  local  or  international  private  enterprises  for  the  development  and 
execution of business endeavors that engage with the population at the bottom of the 
socioeconomic pyramid. However, the projects should have the potential to be scaled 
up for the achievement of more ambitious development goals in the medium and long 
run (see IADB 2006, 2). Perfectly in line with C.K. Prahalad’s theory, OMJ requires its 
models to be directly linked to a company’s profitability or competitiveness, clearly 
distinguishing it from CSR or philanthropic activities (see IADB 2006, 6). It thereby 
claims to recognize the BoP population’s potential as economic actors (consumers 
as well as producers) and intends to foster the majority’s entrepreneurial spirit (see 
ibid). Furthermore, the OMJ Initiative seeks to help position the BoP market as an 
emerging market for the future which can be an important source for growth and 
innovation for businesses (see ibid). 
The OM Facility was created by the IADB with an initial budget of US$250 million for 
the period 2007-2011 with the possibility to be increased depending on the initiative’s 
results achieved during the first two years of operations (see IADB 2006, 18). The 
OMJ operations are part of the IADB’s non-sovereign-guaranteed operations whose 
limit is set at 10 % of total lending volume by the Bank’s Board of Governors (see 
ibid). 
OMJ investments are not limited to a specific sector. On the contrary, they comply 
with the recommendation of the UN Millennium Project (2005), according to which 
“[p]olicies to promote economic and human development need to focus not only on  
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income  but  also  on  factors  such  as  social  services,  infrastructure  development,  
human security,  and democratic  political  participation.  This  includes targeted and 
sustainable  improvements  in  health,  education,  nutrition,  access  to  basic  water,  
sanitation  and  transport,  and  increased  and  equal  opportunities  for  marginalized  
groups in  society.”  Nevertheless,  six  target  areas have been identified which are 
perceived as key “to overcome bottlenecks that have limited inclusive growth” (IADB 
2006, 1) and thus represent a particular focus of OMJ investments. The OMJ Target 
Areas with respective quantitatively measurable goals have been defined as follows:
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Table 2: OMJ Target Areas
OMJ Target Area Quantitative Goals
Citizen identification -  Decrease  by  50% the  percentage  of  children 
under  age 5 without  legal identity  (from 15% in 
2005 to 7.5%).
Financial Democracy - Double the number of Majority households with 
savings accounts (from 15% to 30%)
-  Triple  the  number  of  micro  enterprises  with 
access to formal credit (from 5 to 15 million)
-  Decrease  by  50%  the  transaction  costs  of 
sending  remittances  to  the  region  (from  6%  to 
below 3%)
Employment  Generation  and 
Entrepreneurship
- Decrease by 50% the time required to register a 
company (from average of 63 days to 30 days)
-  Increase  by  25%  the  percentage  of  Majority 
workers under the age of 65 included in a social 
security or pension program (from 24% to 30%)
-  Cut  by  one-fourth  the  percentage  of  workers 
earning “poverty” wages
Basic Infrastructure Services -  By  2016,  decrease  by  11  million  the number 
Majority people without access to piped water; by 
5 million the people without access to improved 
sanitation services; by 1 million the people without 
access  to  reliable  electricity;  and  improve 
transportation for 53 million persons
Information  and  Communication 
Technology
- Increase Internet access in the region by 200% 
from 15% to 45%
- Increase access to  personal  computers  in  the 
Region (measured as PCs per 100 inhabitants) by 
200% from 8% to 24%
- Increase by 60% access of Majority households 
to telephone services (either fixed line or cellular 
service),  increasing  access  from  37%  of  the 
Majority population to 59%
Housing
Source: IADB 2006
-  Double the annual  production  of  new housing 
solutions by the private sector in the region, from 
1 million to 2 million solutions per year
-  Reduce by 15% the proportion of  the Majority 
that  lives  in  overcrowded  homes  (from  33% to 
28% of the persons in the first seven deciles of 
the income distribution)
-  Reduce by 35% the proportion of  the Majority 
that lives in dwellings with dirt or sand floors (from 
28% to 18%).
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Although acknowledging that the selected fields of concentration represent only a few 
of  the  many sectors  and activities  needed to  promote  sustainable  and  equitable 
development in the region, the IADB is convinced of the potential of these particular 
areas for creating synergies with the private sector as an actor in development and 
poverty alleviation (see IADB 2006, 1). Moreover, among all organizations active in 
BoP  investment,  the  IADB  is  the  only  institution  to  adopt  a  strategic  approach 
focusing on specific target areas for these transactions (see IADB 2006, 2f). 
Additional to covering one of the six OMJ Target Areas, potential projects must fulfill 
a number of other criteria to be eligible for OMJ financing of which the most distinct 
are  the  following (see IADB 2007,  Annex 1:  A):  Potential  OMJ projects  must  be 
innovative, in the sense that they develop new ways of doing business with the BoP 
population through the engagement of a private sector entity using a hybrid or novel 
business  model  or  partnership  with  a  BoP community  organization,  NGO or  the 
public sector for the benefit of the poor. Moreover, they must be “scalable”, i.e. have 
the potential to be replicated or adapted to reach a larger group of people in the 
same country and beyond.  Of particular importance is the project’s development 
impact  on  the  BoP population.  It  is  therefore required  that  OMJ projects  provide 
measurable and verifiable evidence of their positive economic and social impact on 
the poor through regular evaluation and performance measurement (see IADB 2007, 
Annex 1: C). Additionally, every OM project has to comply with the IADB’s strategy 
for the respective country in which it is intended to be executed as well as with the 
Bank’s  policies  concerning  environmental  and  social  impacts  and  corporate 
governance. 
In terms of investment size, individual projects financed by the OM Facility, either 
through loans or partial credit guarantees, must not exceed US$10 million, and the 
majority of projects approved to date range from US$ 5 million to US$ 10 million in 
investment size (see OMJ 2009 and IADB 2010, www).
OMJ  projects  are  also  subject  to  particular  operational  criteria  (see  IADB 2007, 
Annex 1: B): These include, for example, pricing for the loan or guarantee which is 
determined on a case-by-case basis with market rates as benchmarks reflecting the 
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operation’s  corresponding  risk  profile.  Likewise,  tenor,  grace  period  and  other 
financial terms are determined specifically for each transaction. 
Often times OMJ loans and guarantees are accompanied by “technical cooperation” 
(TC) projects which seek to strengthen the structure of the loan and the capacity of 
the low-income, beneficiary community to receive and maximize benefits (see OMJ 
2009, www). Such TCs can be the conduct of a market analysis, for example, or a 
training program for the BoP population involved in an investment project, and they 
are always financed through grants, i.e. non-reimbursable funds. Given the office’s 
own limited budget for such projects, a strategic fund has been established with the 
aim to raise funds with a variety of public and private donors who wish to promote 
market-based solutions to address the needs of low income populations (see ibid).
Apart  from  grant  and  investment  projects,  the  OMJ  Initiative  also  engages  in 
research  on  the  BoP in  Latin  America.  In  partnership  with  national  development 
agencies from donor countries and NGOs such as the World Resources Institute, 
OMJ  conducted  research  on  market  characteristics  of  the  majority  population, 
identified potential  private sector  stakeholders and developed innovative business 
models targeting the BoP in a mutually beneficial way for the companies as well as 
the poor (see IADB 2007, www).
Initially, there was some confusion about the need for OMJ and its activities (see 
Dana M) as well as concerns raised by the Board of Governors. Existing units of the 
bank  claimed  that  there  work  was  already  covering  the  improvement  of  living 
conditions for the majority of low-income people in LAC (Dana M) and bank leaders 
feared running “(…) the risk of engaging firms that only see the majority as a market  
to be served and not a society to be developed”  (IADB 2007, 3).  However, OMJ 
justified its additionality with its focus on investments targeted exclusively at private 
organizations with the aim of fostering the creation of employment for the majority in 
microenterprises, SMEs and MNEs for which a clear “business case” can be shown 
(ibid). At any rate, OMJ operations were meant to complement and not substitute any 
of the already existing IADB activities in the public or the private sector (see Martin, 
Dana 2009). Moreover, in order to increase its accountability and prove the positive 
contribution to development of its projects, OMJ has developed a special tool for the 
systematic  assessment  of  the  development  impact  of  its  projects:  The  OMJ 
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Development  Effectiveness  Matrix  (DEM)11 (see  Annex  3).  This  table  provides  a 
rating of the development outcomes of an OMJ project as well as of the IADB’s role 
(or “additionality”) in the operation. The development outcomes are measured by four 
area  ratings:  project  or  company  business  performance,  environmental  &  social 
effects, private sector development and IADB strategic development objectives. The 
Bank’s additionality is assessed by its financial and non-financial contribution. Each 
of these area ratings is composed of 2-6 assessments of single project properties, 
such as  the financial  rate  of  return (for  the  business  performance),  facilitation of 
market  expansion  and  competition  (for  private  sector  development)  or  the 
participation of the target population in the project design and implementation (for the 
IADB strategic development objectives). Already at project design, OMJ investment 
officers and project  leaders are responsible  for  rating the 23 assessment  criteria 
according  to  5  categories  (excellent,  good,  satisfactory,  partly  unsatisfactory  and 
unsatisfactory)  on  the  basis  of  assessment  guidelines  and  specific  project 
information. The single ratings are subsequently aggregated to the area ratings and 
ultimately, to the overall comprehensive rating of the project. After completion of the 
project, the ratings are verified by the IADB’s independent Office of Evaluation and 
Oversight (OVE) which directly reports to the Board of Governors (see IADB 2008, 
4). The Development Effectiveness Matrix has thus become an important evaluation 
tool for the implementation of accountable and results-based operations (see ibid). 
After the  positive assessment and approval of OMJ’s first projects, support for the 
office’s  activities  was growing,  among the Board of  Governors as  well  as  on an 
institutional level with the MIF and SCF department engaging in co-financing of a 
number of OMJ projects (see Martin, Dana 2009).
During its first year of operation, the OMJ Initiative completed one operation, a US $ 
25,000,000 investment in a newly established venture capital fund for early stage and 
growth  companies  in  LAC  whose  business  activities  are  targeted  at  low-income 
populations. The fund (IGNIA) shares the same mission as OMJ and in particular, 
also targets investments in sectors such as healthcare, housing, education, nutrition 
and basic utilities to benefit  people at the BoP (IADB 2008). By the end of 2009, 
however,  the  Initiative  counted  no  less  than  13  projects  approved,  with  a  total 
11  However,  a similar  tool  is  used for  the assessment  of  other  IADB projects,  including sovereign 
guaranteed loans (see IADB 2008, 13).
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investment volume of about US$ 1.2 billion and nine eligible investment projects in 
the pipeline for 2010 (see OMJ 2009 and IADB 2010, www). 
4.6.4 Project Examples 
In the following chapter, I will present two examples of OMJ projects. It is important to 
understand,  however,  that  due  to  the  ample  variety  of  economic  sectors  and 
industries  as  well  as  the  large  number  of  countries  in  which  OMJ operates,  the 
chosen projects can by no means be labeled representative. I deliberately chose to 
present the project “La Riojana” because of its extraordinarily inclusive design and 
high degree of inclusion of  local  beneficiaries and the “Social  Financing Program 
EPM-UNE” because of its certain controversy. Following the description of each of 
the projects, I will, in the next chapter, attempt to assess them applying the points of 
critique explained in chapter 3. Although I am aware that single case studies cannot 
serve to validate or discredit a development model, I will use these specific cases to 
point out strengths and weaknesses in the practice of the BoP approach. Eventually, 
I will try to come to a conclusion about the benefits and caveats of market based 
solutions for poverty alleviation for the BoP population as executed by the IADB’s 
Opportunities for the Majority Initiative. 
a) La Riojana
This  project  intends  to  provide  financial  support  for  the  strengthening  and 
expansion of business operations of the agricultural cooperative “La Riojana” in La 
Rioja, Argentina. “La Riojana” is a cooperative of small low-income wine producers, 
established in 1940. Inherent to this form of organization, it is entirely owned by its 
members  and  governed  according  to  democratic  principles.  With  almost  500 
members,  the  cooperative  unites  more  than  80% of  all  small  producers  of  the 
region, which with almost 27% of households living below the poverty line, is the 
second poorest of the country. For these people at the bottom of the pyramid, wine 
production has not only traditionally been the primary source of income, but is also 
deeply rooted in their cultural life. “La Riojana” has been highly successful in the 
past, receiving numerous national and international awards for its products, which 
are elaborated according to internationally recognized environmental and fair trade 
standards. However, given the significant changes in the wine market during the 
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last  years,  investments  in  the  wine  business  are  urgently  needed.  To  remain 
competitive  and  guarantee  that  the   vine  cultivation  remain  a  viable  source  of 
income for future generations, the cooperative needs to adapt its production to the 
domestic and international demand, which has increasingly shifted to red instead of 
the traditionally cultivated white wine. Since vine naturally needs several years to 
grow  and  produce  fruits,  the  cooperative  is  essentially  in  need  of  long-term 
financing which, esp. in the aftermath of the Argentine currency crisis in 1999 and 
in the wake of the current unfavorable financial conditions, is difficult for it to obtain 
as an organization and impossible for its individual members who, as members of 
the BoP, do usually not have access to conventional forms of finance. “La Riojana” 
has thus approached the IADB, and more specifically OMJ, in request for funds. 
Together with officials from the Initiative, an investment project has been developed 
to support the cooperative’s business and its owners. OMJ intends to contribute 
50% of the total investment cost of the project, which is expected to amount to US$ 
5.8 million. The remaining amount will  be provided by the cooperative itself, the 
regional public authority and parts of a different IDB loan to the Argentine Viticulture 
Corporation, a parafiscal body promoting the sustainable development of the wine 
sector in Argentina. With these resources, a microcredit fund will  be established 
allowing  the  small  producers  to  access  the  needed  means  for  financing  new 
technical  equipment  and  machinery  and  meet  their  working  capital  needs. 
Moreover, the investment project will be accompanied by a “technical cooperation” 
(i.e. non-reimbursable investment) from the Argentine government which seeks to 
facilitate  the  market  access  for  the  cooperative’s  products  and  strengthen  its 
institutional structures to better accommodate its members interests. The medium- 
and long-term objective of the project is to strengthen the existing production chains 
involving  small  wine  producers  for  further  export  of  their  products  to  the  world 
market which is expected to result in the generation of higher and stable incomes 
for the BoP population in La Rioja. 
Source: Project Concept Document “La Riojana” AR-L1096
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b) Social Financing Program EPM 
The objective of  this project  is  to increase the access to  banking to previously 
“unbanked”  low  income  populations  in  Colombia,  by  leveraging  the  billing 
information and payment histories of EPM’s customer base. Nearly 45 % of the 
Colombian adult population has no access to any formal financial service and is 
thus forced to recur to friends, family or informal money lenders as credit sources, 
who often charge significantly higher interest rates. The “unbanked” population in 
Colombia is especially at risk because of factors such as poor education and high 
unemployment,  often  resulting  in  subsistence  activities  in  the  informal  sector. 
Access to finance has also proven to have a positive effect on firm creation, pro-
poor economic growth and the reduction of inequalities. Furthermore, it can be a 
safety net for families suffering from a temporary shock due to income reduction or 
instability.   
The  goal  of  this  OMJ  project  is  thus:  (i)  to  improve  access  to  cheaper  credit 
services at competitive market rates to low income populations; (ii) to improve their 
quality of life by providing access to home improvement finance and new and more 
efficient appliances as well as other goods and services; and (iii)  to reduce the 
consumption of  energy by giving the beneficiaries the possibility  to  replace old 
appliances with more-energy efficient ones. In addition, it will facilitate their access 
to a second credit or savings account.
A US$ 10 million loan will be provided to  Empresas Públicas de Medellín (EPM), 
the  municipally-owned  provider  of  electric,  natural  gas  and  water  distribution 
services of Medellín, who will  use the funds to set up a trust which will provide 
revolving credit lines for the purchase of domestic appliances (such as washing 
machines, refrigerators, microwaves, air conditioners etc.), technology goods (such 
as computers and telephones), video and audio equipment (such as TVs, digital 
cameras, DVD and home theater systems etc) and home improvement materials 
(such as flooring materials, baths and kitchens) for low-income customers. EPM 
itself  will  contribute  another  US$  30  million  to  the  trust.  The  company  has 
established a comprehensive network of allied retail distribution stores where the 
borrowers will be able to purchase the goods using specially issued credit cards. 
Billing and payment for the purchases, however, will be done through regular EPM 
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utility  invoices.  The  Project  follows  the  example  of  Codensa,  the  local  energy 
distributor  in  Bogotá,  who  implemented  a  similar  program  with  highly  positive 
effects on the living standards of the poor as well as on the financial returns to the 
company. EMP will  provide revolving lines of credit primarily to approx. 150.000 
low-income households through 2015 who have demonstrated a good payment 
record. By leveraging this information, the project solves one of the most relevant 
market failures in BoP markets: the lack of reliable data on credit histories of low-
income individuals which can potentially be used for future BoP transactions (such 
as  microinsurance  etc.).  Furthermore,  the  project  uses  an  existing  commercial 
platform  –  utility  services  –  to  provide  previously  unavailable  services  to  this 
population segment. 
The project’s development impact will be measured by outcome targets specified in 
the  respective  Development  Effectiveness  Matrix.  These  are,  in  particular,  the 
percentage  of  previously  unbanked  BoP  clients  who,  after  participating  in  the 
project,  have  access  to  multiple  financial  services,  the  amount  of  reduction  in 
annual  interest  rates  for  those  populations  as  well  as  the  increase  in  tenors 
available to them. Ex-ante assessments of all  these indicators have been rated 
“excellent”. 
Source: Project Profile “Social Financing Program EPM-UNE” CO-L1080
4.6.5 Evaluation of OMJ Project Examples: Applying the points of BoP critique 
After  introducing  two  important  OMJ projects  in  the  previous  chapter,  I  will  now 
continue with a systematic assessment thereof. Using the points of critique outlined 
in the theoretical chapter 3 of this thesis as a framework, my goal is to find out if or to 
what extent they apply to these OMJ projects, which exemplify the implementation of 
Prahalad’s BoP model by the Inter-American Development Bank. 
a. Narrow definition of poverty and development  
Although the IADB recognizes the multiple facets of poverty, including the lack of 
access to food, clean water, education, health services and personal safety (see 
IADB 1997, 1), its poverty reduction efforts are nevertheless primarily focused 
on the eradication of monetary poverty and the raising of income for the poor. 
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This  is  based  on  the  assumption  that  “(…)  income  provides  the  means  to 
guarantee adequate levels of all the other basic necessities” (ibid). In this matter, 
the IADB is completely aligned with the policies of the World Bank and the IMF. 
The Opportunities for the Majority Office is no exception and, just like any other 
department or office of the IADB, it primarily aims to alter the standard of living 
of poor people by targeting the improvement of their monetary welfare. 
Karnani’s critique at the narrow definition of poverty in Prahalad’s BoP model is 
therefore directly applicable also to the activities of OMJ and the IADB (as well 
as the other IFIs) in general. 
b. Over-estimation of the BOP market size  
This point of critique cannot be directly applied to OMJ projects because the 
IADB does not work on a global level, but only in the LAC region. Moreover, it 
does not rely on Prahalad’s estimation of BoP market size but together with 
NGOs  and  national  development  organizations  conducted  extensive  market 
research  and  prepared  its  own  studies  as  a  basis  for  its  projects  and 
interventions (see Martin, Dana 2009). These studies showed the existence of a 
market worth US$ 500 billion consisting of 350 million people who earn less 
than US$ 300 per month in the region. These numbers seem to make a case for 
the potential of private sector involvement in poverty reduction strategies which 
also yield profits for the companies.  
c. MNCs are not suitable for BOP business  
C.K. Prahalad originally envisioned MNCs as primary actors intervening on a 
large  scale  in  the  global  BoP  market.  Critics,  however,  have  doubted  the 
feasibility as well as the positive contributions to (local) economic development 
of  this  idea (see chapter  3).  Similar  concerns have also been raised by the 
IADB’s Board of Governors when establishing the OMJ Initiative:  “While some 
firms share the goals stated above and may see the overriding need to operate  
in  successful  societies,  financial  considerations  may temper  their  willingness 
and capacity to enter into ventures whose profitability is in the longer term or is  
uncertain. The overriding goal for all private firms is profitability and, from a solid  
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basis of profitability, firms could engage in activities that promote the welfare of  
the majority. Unless proper incentives are in place, we run the risk of engaging 
firms that only see the majority as a market to be served and not a society to be 
developed” (IADB 2007, 3). 
Although the BoP approach developed by C.K. Prahalad provides the theoretical 
foundation  for  the  IADB’s  OMJ Initiative,  the  practical  implementation  of  the 
model by the office seems to differ with regard to the role of MNCs. While OMJ 
has collaborated with MNCs in some projects (e.g. street paving with CEMEX, 
see chapter 3), in the vast majority of cases, it has supported local enterprises, 
mostly  SMEs  or  microenterprises  (see  IADB  2009:  OMJ  annual  report). 
However,  this  must  not  be  understood  as  undesirable  incompliance  with 
Prahalad’s  theory,  but  rather  as  part  of  OMJ’s  mission,  which  among  other 
things includes “(…) creating and strengthening microenterprises and small and 
medium sized businesses and to promote sources of employment and income 
for  the  Majority,  in  particular  taking  advantage  of  the  operation  of  new and  
existing clusters and the opportunities to involve those businesses in the value 
chain of larger enterprises” (IADB 2007, 3). 
The case studies presented in the previous chapter reflect this practice. 
“La  Riojana”  is  a  prime example  of  a  local  medium sized enterprise,  which, 
thanks to its exceptional  organization as cooperative, contributes to inclusive 
development  essentially  driven  by  its  owners  who  are  indigenous  micro 
entrepreneurs.  Thanks  to  democratic  ownership  and  government  structures, 
cooperatives are also regarded as a form of social business (see chapter 2). The 
downside of working with local SMEs as opposed to large MNCs, however, is 
the shorter reach of beneficiaries, which is limited to the viticulturists and their 
families. 
The second case of “EPM-UNE” does not have such a strong focus on Bottom-
up development. In this project, the local BoP population is involved only in the 
role of consumers of credit as well as designated consumer goods delivered by 
the fairly large company EPM. Although EPM is not a Multinational Enterprise, it 
is a major economic player in the project region as it is the provider of utility 
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services to 1.7 million customers in the city of Medellín (see PP CO-L1080, 18). 
Thanks  to  such  a  large  client  base,  the  number  of  beneficiaries  of  “Social 
Financing  EPM-UNE”  reaches  150.000.  This  is  in  stark  contrast  to  the  500 
micro-entrepreneurs  benefiting  from  the  project  “La  Riojana”  and  clearly 
demonstrates the frequent trade-off between the reach of an intervention and 
participation by local beneficiaries.  Nevertheless, another important difference 
between Prahalad’s theory and the OMJ project “Social Financing EPM-UNE” is 
that the company is publicly owned; thus implying a strong collaboration with the 
public  sector  and  at  least  an  indirect  participation  of  the  people  through 
municipal elections. 
These aspects of the project are also captured in the Development Effectiveness 
Matrix for “Social Financing EPM-UNE” (see see PP CO-L1080, Annex). While 
the project’s targeting of Majority populations and potential for scale have been 
rated as “excellent”,  the role of the target population in the project has been 
identified  as  merely  “satisfactory”.  However,  the  DEM  acknowledges  OMJ’s 
collaboration with a publicly owned company and awards a “good” rating for the 
project’s alliances with other stakeholders. In addition, by leveraging the billing 
information of a utility provider for other large-scale development interventions, 
the  project’s  potential  for  replication  in  the  LAC  region  has  been  given  an 
“excellent” assessment.
d. Exploitation of the poor  
One of the most important points of critique at the BoP concept is its perception 
as  unethical  exploitation  of  the  poor,  which  instead  of  bettering  their  living 
conditions results in the complete opposite to the sole benefit of MNCs based in 
the Global North. Such criticism is especially directed at business models with a 
main  focus  on  merely  selling  products  to  the  poor,  which  include  the  BoP 
population only as passive consumers but not producers. It has been argued that 
such interventions may actually worsen living conditions for the poor if they result 
in a misplacement of priorities and unwise allocation of their scarce resources 
(see chapter 3).
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In terms of the two OMJ project examples described above, such critique may be 
warranted in the case of “Social Financing EPM-UNE”. Though not directly selling 
products to the poor, objective of the business model is to stimulate low-income 
people’s consumption through the issuing of microcredit. While this practice does 
not imply negative effects per se – after all,  microfinance has proven to be a 
powerful tool for the start-up of microenterprises or the investment in education, 
health or energy services (see Yunus 1998) – the focus of the program run by 
EPM appears suspicious. Instead of encouraging investments in human capital 
(such as education or health) or productive investments in microenterprises, the 
use  of  microloans  awarded  by  the  company  is  limited  to  the  purchase  of 
designated goods, many of which classify as luxury goods. Clients may use the 
loan to acquire materials for an improvement of their housing situation (such as 
floors, baths and kitchens) as well as durable consumer goods (such as washing 
machines and refrigerators)  but  they  may also  opt  for  a  laptop,  TV or  digital 
camera. Whether these restrictions on the use of the microloan are indeed the 
most effective in terms of developmental impact should be subject to question. 
Given that over 90% of the target population already owns a refrigerator and more 
than 60 % are in the possession of a washing machine (see PP CO-L1080, 13), it 
is  possible  that  many  will  use  the  microloan  for  investments  in  luxury  goods 
instead of home improvement materials. Even though it is yet too early to predict 
outcomes, the project concept alone may warrant some criticism. 
The  OMJ  case  study  of  “La  Riojana”,  however,  takes  into  account  important 
remarks made by Prahalad’s critics concerning the use of microcredit in the BoP 
context. According to Karnani (2007), the only way to alleviate poverty is to raise 
the real income of the poor, and one way of doing this is by raising their incomes. 
This is essentially  the objective of the OMJ project “La Riojana”.  By awarding 
microloans  to  the  owners  of  the  viticulture  cooperative  for  investment  in  new 
plants  and  production  technologies,  the  enterprise  is  strengthened  in  its 
competitiveness  domestically  and  abroad.  Jaiswal  (2007)  also  suggests  this 
implementation  of  microcredit,  which  enables  the  poor  to  access  powerful 
markets  with  their  products,  generating  sufficient  profits  and  allowing  the 
microenterprise  to  grow  and  expand  its  reach  to  a  larger  number  of  small 
producers.  Additionally,  “La  Riojana”  being  organized  as  a  cooperative, 
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guarantees a democratic governance and distribution of profits of the business. In 
this sense, it represents an ideal example of a bottom-up driven social business 
model which includes the BoP population as consumers as well as producers of 
goods.  By participating in the project, their standard of living is altered through 
higher incomes, stable employment as well as access to previously unavailable 
goods and services. 
These positive outcomes are also reflected in  the  ratings in  the Development 
Effectiveness  Matrix.  The  DEM for  “La  Riojana”  acknowledges  the  “excellent” 
targeting of Majority populations as well as their active contribution in the project 
(see  PP  AR-L1096,  12).  Given  that  this  is  mainly  thanks  to  “La  Riojana”’s 
organization as a cooperative, the successful collaboration with such a type of 
business is rather innovative and has an important potential for future replication 
in Argentina and other LAC countries for the IADB (see ibid). Top rankings were 
also given to the OMJ project’s contribution to market expansion, technology & 
know-how transfer and alliances with multiple stakeholders, among others (see 
ibid). 
e. Detracting from the imperative to correct government failures  
Another controversial aspect of Prahalad’s theory is the complete neglect of the 
public sector’s role in poverty reduction. Thereby, the model ignores the fact that 
appropriate economic policies, basic infrastructure and functioning institutions – 
which form the necessary framework for any private sector activities – must be 
set by the government (see Karnani 2007, 106).
In  the  context  of  OMJ  projects,  however,  a  more  positive  and  collaborative 
attitude toward the public sector can be identified. 
In  the case of  “La  Riojana”,  public  sector  involvement  is  strong given that  a 
substantial part of the project funds is contributed by the regional public authority 
and  the  Argentine  Viticulture  Corporation,  a  parafiscal  body  promoting  the 
sustainable  development  of  the  wine  sector  in  Argentina.  Furthermore,  the 
Argentine government supports the project with a grant for technical assistance 
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aiming at  the facilitation of  market  access for  the cooperative’s  products and 
strengthening of its institutional structures. 
The project “Social Financing EPM-UNE” also demonstrates cooperation with the 
public  sector  as  the  principal  actor  in  the  operation,  the  company  Empresas 
Públicas de Medellín (EPM), is the municipally-owned provider of electric, natural 
gas and water distribution services in the city of Medellín. In fact, it is precisely 
thanks to the collaboration with this public entity that valuable information about 
the credit history of the BoP population can be accessed and potentially used for 
future operations. By using the commercial platform of (public) utility services, the 
reach of the project is also remarkable.
As is evident from the two OMJ project examples, the office clearly values the 
contribution and collaboration with the public sector if it supports a market-based 
solution  to  poverty  reduction.  Deviating  from Prahalad’s  original  theory,  OMJ 
does  not  seek  to  substitute  or  compete  with  public  policies  aiming  at  the 
reduction  of  poverty,  but  rather  intends  to  forge  creative  partnerships  with  a 
variety of stakeholders, among which the public sector is one (see IADB 2007, 
Annex 1: A). Thus, this is also one of the 23 criteria for the assessment of a 
project’s  development  effectiveness  according  the  DEM.  For  both  project 
examples the rating has been “excellent”.
f. Scope of activities and targeting of LLDCs insufficient  
Critics  have  raised  doubts  about  the  feasibility  and  effectiveness  of  BoP 
transactions in Least Developed Countries (LLDCs) (see chapter 3). Targeting 
primarily the population living on less than US$ 2 per day, the focus of Prahlad’s 
model  indeed  seems  to  be  the  alleviation  of  moderate  rather  than  absolute 
poverty. However, given the level of economic development of the majority of the 
countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, the BoP approach seems quite 
appropriate for addressing the challenge of poverty in this region. Most countries 
in LAC belong to the group of Middle-Income countries (see World Bank 2010, 
www) and the percentage of population living in absolute poverty is relatively low 
compared to other geographical regions in the Global South. Except for Haiti, 
which classifies not only as Low-Income country (see World Bank 2010, www) 
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but also as LLDC (see UN-OHRLLS 2010, www), all 42 countries in the region 
belong to the category of Middle-Income countries, including emerging markets 
such as Argentina, Chile, Mexico and Brazil. These countries have experienced 
tremendous progress in development and poverty reduction during the last years 
and though not  yet  fully  eradicated,  absolute poverty  has decreased sharply. 
Nonetheless,  differences  exist  between  Upper-  and  Lower-Middle  Income 
countries;  to  the  latter  belonging  Belize,  Bolivia,  El  Salvador,  Guatemala, 
Guyana,  Honduras,  Nicaragua,  Paraguay  and  São  Tomé  and  Principe  (see 
World Bank 2010, www). The IADB distinguishes accordingly and classifies the 
countries according to the level of economic development and respective lending 
capacity  in  categories  A-D.  Category  A  comprises  the  borrowing  member 
countries with the highest GDP and best creditworthiness, whereas the countries 
with the relatively lowest national income belong to category D. The criteria for 
lending is adapted to the four categories, so that C and D countries enjoy more 
favorable  loan  conditions  than  the  countries  belonging  to  group  A  and  B. 
Approximately 35 % of the IADB’s total lending volume is channeled to countries 
belonging to the lending categories C and D (see IADB 2010, www).
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Table 3: IADB Lending Categories
A B C D
Argentina
Brazil
Mexico
Venezuela
Chile
Colombia
Peru
Bahamas 
Barbados 
Costa Rica
Jamaica 
Panama 
Suriname 
Trinidad&Tobago
Uruguay
Belize
Bolivia 
Dominican 
Republic 
Ecuador
El Salvador
Guatemala
Guyana
Haiti
Honduras
Nicaragua 
Paraguay
Source: IADB 1974
Up to date, the OMJ office has supported more than 20 country specific projects 
(loans,  guarantees  and  grants  for  Technical  Assistance)  in  over  8  different 
member countries, additional to several regional projects (see IADB 2009, OMJ 
Annual  Report).  Promoting  BoP  business  models  throughout  the  whole  LAC 
region, it does not prioritize according to the project location.
Concerning the  scope of  activities,  however,  it  is  evident  that  the  number  of 
beneficiaries  reached  through  BoP projects  supported  by  OMJ up to  date  is 
limited. This is mainly due to the fact that the BoP idea and OMJ as an institution 
are  very  young  and  respective  projects  just  started..  Nevertheless,  OMJ  is 
striving to grow in size, expand the reach of its operations to a larger number of 
beneficiaries and promote the BoP concept (Martin, Dana 2009). If eventually, 
BoP  business  can  be  transformed  into  an  industry,  as  has  happened  with 
microfinance  initiated  by  M.  Yunus’  Grameen  Bank,  the  potential  reach  and 
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scope  of  BoP  activities  could  indeed  be  extensive  in  LAC  and  other  world 
regions.  
g.   Lack of a macroeconomic analysis
Since the OMJ Initiative has its theoretical foundation in C.K. Prahalad’s theory of 
the BoP, it also emphasizes a micro-economic approach to poverty reduction (see 
IADB 2006,  1).  However,  unlike  Prahalad’s  thinking,  OMJ activities  cannot  be 
blamed for lacking a component of macroeconomic analysis. After all, OMJ is still 
a part of the IADB, an institution whose primary approach to development has 
been  from  a  macro-level  (see  ibid).  In  fact,  precisely  because  of  its  micro-
economic focus, the implementation of the BoP model through OMJ represents a 
new development approach for the IADB, justified in part by the identification of a 
missing link between macroeconomic growth and the positive impact on overall 
society (see ibid). Nonetheless, even though OMJ projects operate mostly on the 
micro-level,  they  are  always required  to  comply  with  the  overall  IADB country 
strategy (see IADB 2006, 5), which essentially outlines the medium- and long-term 
macroeconomic development objectives for the particular project country. 
5. CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
5.1 Main findings and conclusion
Despite many years of efforts and development interventions global poverty, defined 
in  monetary,  biometrical  or  capability  terms,  still  prevails.  Traditional  aid-based 
strategies, mostly driven by the public sector, have not produced the desired results 
and chances of  meeting  the  first  Millennium Development  Goal  of  halving  global 
poverty by the year 2015 are small. Given this reality, some academics have turned 
toward the private sector as an actor in development. Its capacity to innovate and 
efficiently  use  resources,  increasing  importance  in  our  globalized  society  and  its 
financial  means seem to make it  a  promising player  in  the fight  against  poverty. 
Indeed,  corporations  have  engaged  in  this  endeavor  for  several  reasons  and  in 
different ways, such as policy dialogue, Corporate Social Responsibility programs or 
social  business  models.  Out  of  this  rationale,  C.K.  Prahalad  and  Stuart  Hart 
developed  the  Bottom-of-the-Pyramid  approach,  which  intends  to  achieve  the 
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alleviation  of  poverty  by  directing  profitable  business  activities  at  low-income 
populations and incorporating them into the formal economy. The pyramid is used as 
a  metaphor  for  the  income  distribution  in  society,  with  the  top  representing  the 
wealthy  minority  and  the  bottom  representing  the  population  with  low  incomes. 
Despite much criticism for dubious assumptions and the potential risk of exploiting 
the  poor,  Prahalad’s  theory  enjoyed  high  acceptance  among  international 
development institutions. The Inter-American Development Bank has demonstrated 
particular interest and founded the Opportunities for the Majority Initiative dedicated 
exclusively to the support of BoP business solutions. The intention of my thesis was 
to  provide  a  critical  assessment  of  the  activities  of  OMJ,  i.e.  the  practical 
implementation of Prahalad’s BoP model in order to make a statement about the 
feasibility and effectiveness of this poverty reduction strategy. For this reason, I will 
revisit  the research hypotheses concerning  the  activities  of  OMJ,  which  I  initially 
outlaid in chapter 1, and try to verify/falsify them.
 The OMJ office of the IADB supports projects which fit C.K. Prahalad’s BoP 
business concept; yet not all of its projects fully comply with Prahalad’s theory. 
Although drawing upon Prahalad’s theory in its founding articles (see IADB 2006), 
the projects implemented by the Opportunities for the Majority office of the IADB do 
not always fully comply with Prahalad’s theoretical model as has been demonstrated 
in the case studies “La Riojana” and “Social Financing EMP-UNE”. Major differences 
are the support of local companies rather than MNCs and the significant involvement 
of the public sector in project funding as well as execution. These deviations from the 
theory  are  due  to  practical  reasons  as  well  as  OMJ’s  explicit  mandate  to  forge 
creative partnerships with multiple stakeholders (see IADB 2006) in order to ensuring 
the benefit of the BoP population from market based solutions for poverty reduction.
 The  points  of  critique  raised  at  the  theoretical  concept  of  Prahalad’s  BoP 
model also apply to its implementation through OMJ projects, except in cases 
where a deviation from Prahalad’s model has been adopted.
The assessment of the case studies “La Riojana” and “Social Financing EPM-UNE” 
have shown that some of the critique raised at Prahalad’s theory is also warranted for 
the practice. In adopting the narrow definition of poverty based on purely monetary 
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terms, the projects supported by OMJ primarily neglect all other potential aspects of 
poverty and are by definition unable to directly contribute to the improvement of any 
other facets of poverty than the lack of income. Just like Prahalad’s theory,  OMJ 
projects thereby run the risk of failing to address the root causes of poverty and the 
structures which prevent people from overcoming it. 
The accusation of MNCs exploiting low-income individuals by incorporating them into 
the value chain only as consumers (not producers or vendors) of goods which might 
not even enhance their welfare must also be considered in practice. Although “Social 
Financing  EPM-UNE”  involves  a  public  company  instead  of  a  MNC,  the  project 
nonetheless focuses on selling goods, many of which classify as luxury goods, to 
BoP populations without incorporating them productively into the value chain. 
Such critique does not apply to the case of “La Riojana”; however, this project differs 
considerably  by  having  as  main  actor  not  a  MNC  but  a  local  cooperative.  It  is 
tempting to conclude from the comparison of these two case studies that MNCs are 
not suited for BoP business which truly benefits the poor as much as the company in 
general. Nevertheless, I would like to warn of such unfounded conclusions and rather 
emphasize once more the limitations of my research project which only examined 
two selected projects in a specific context. In order to make valid general statements 
about the BoP model and OMJ activities much more research will be necessary.
5.2 Outlook and further thoughts
Despite initial confusion and certain criticism, recognition and support for the BoP 
approach has strongly increased in recent years. National development agencies, 
NGOs,  Multilateral  Development  Banks and the  United  Nations  have all  become 
active in the identification and support of projects which seek to eradicate poverty 
through profits. Some have clearly expressed the aim of expanding activities in this 
field  (see  Martin,  Dana  2009).  Likewise,  the  business  community  is  showing 
increasing interest in business models with the potential of a win-win scenario for 
both the company and the poor (ibid). 
Similarly, internal support for the Opportunities for the Majority Initiative has grown 
within the Inter-American Development Bank. Conditional on successful operations 
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and continued support by the Board of Governors as well as the President of the 
Bank,  the OMJ office aims to  grow in  budget  size and staff  headcount  after  the 
renewal of its initial lending facility in 2012 (ibid).
In light of  these developments,  it  is  likely that  the approach championed by C.K. 
Prahalad and Stuart Hart will become much more prominent in the future. If, in the 
long run, projects increase in number as well as reach and create an industry of BoP 
business, the vision is to minimize market failures for the poor and “[i]nstead of being 
left out in informal processes where they are paying these poverty penalties they [will  
be] brought in into the mainstream markets and the markets are really working for  
them, both in terms of job creation and in the provision of quality goods and services” 
(Martin, Dana 2009). Once we see this happen, we might find that poverty reduction 
for profit is possible.
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Annex1: IADB CAPITAL STOCK AND VOTING POWER
Borrowing members Shares Votes % of total  votes (1)
Argentina 900,154 900,289 10.751
 Bahamas 17,398 17,533 0.209 
 Barbados 10,767 10,902 0.130 
 Belize 9,178 9,313 0.111
 Bolivia 72,258 72,393 0.865 
 Brazil 900,154 900,289 10.751
 Chile 247,163 247,298 2.953 
 Colombia 247,163 247,298 2.953 
 Costa Rica 36,121 36,256 0.433 
 Dominican Republic 48,220 48,355 0.577 
 Ecuador 48,220 48,355 0.577 
 El Salvador 36,121 36,256 0.433 
 Guatemala 48,220 48,355 0.577 
 Guyana 13,393 13,528 0.162 
 Haiti 36,121 36,256 0.433 
 Honduras 36,121 36,256 0.433 
 Jamaica 48,220 48,355 0.577 
 Mexico 578,632 578,767 6.912
 Nicaragua 36,121 36,256 0.433 
 Panama 36,121 36,256 0.433
 Paraguay 36,121 36,256 0.433 
 Peru 120,445 120,580 1.440 
 Suriname 7,342 7,477 0.089 
 Trinidad and Tobago 36,121 36,256 0.433 
 Uruguay 96,507 96,642 1.154 
 Venezuela 482,267 482,402 5.761 
 Subtotal borrowing members 4,184,669 4,188,179 50.015 
     
 Regional nonborrowing members
 Canada 334,887 335,022 4.001 
 United States 2,512,529 2,512,664 30.006 
 Subtotal regional nonborring members 2,847,416 2,847,686 34.007 
 
 Nonregional Nonborrowing members
 Austria 13,312 13,447 0.161 
 Belgium 27,438 27,573 0.329 
 China, People's Republic of 184 319 0.004
 Croatia 4,018 4,153 0.050 
 Denmark 14,157 14,292 0.171 
 Finland 13,312 13,447 0.161 
 France 158,638 158,773 1.896 
 Germany 158,638 158,773 1.896 
 Israel 13,126 13,261 0.158 
 Italy 158,638 158,773 1.896 
 Japan 418,642 418,777 5.001 
 Korea, Republic of 184 319 0.004 
 Netherlands 28,207 28,342 0.338 
 Norway 14,157 14,292 0.171 
 Portugal 4,474 4,609 0.055 
 Slovenia 2,434 2,569 0.031 
 Spain 158,638 158,773 1.896 
 Sweden 27,268 27,403 0.327 
 Switzerland 39,347 39,482 0.471 
 United Kingdom 80,551 80,686 0.964 
 Subtotal nonregional    nonborrowing members 1,335,363 1,338,063 15.979 
 TOTAL 8,367,448 8,373,928 100.000 
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Annex 2: 
Partial transcript of the Interview of December 15th 2009 with Mr. Dana Martin, 
Senior Investment Officer at the IADB’s Opportunities for the Majority office.
E: I was curious about the origins of OMJ. Can you tell me more about how this 
initiative evolved?
D: Well, the Bank has been involved in both Public and Private Sector Development  
in Latin America obviously for the past 50 years and the private sector work of the 
Bank has evolved during that time. And a few years ago…um…well, at the time the  
new  president  came  to  the  Bank,  Luis  Alberto  Moreno,  it  coincided  with  the  
publication  of  several  leading  texts  on…on this  “business  idea”  that  came up  in  
business schools, largely led by C.K. Prahalad but by other writers as well like Stuart 
Hart, about doing business in the Base of the Pyramid. And the interesting part about  
it  was the  question  of  what  could  a  Multilateral  Development  Bank bring  to  this  
process  to  try  to  help  the  private  sector  enter  as  a  more  prominent  player  in  
development  in  the  region.  And  so  we  had  a  conference…ah…we  had  several  
prominent  speakers  come  to  that  conference  and  we  prepared  a  book  on  the  
occasion at that time to make an argument for what the opportunity was in Latin 
America. Ah, at the conference we had Bill Clinton, ah with our new president, Luis  
Alberto Moreno, and we also had several other prominent speakers, like Hernando  
de Soto, and Carlos Slim from Mexico and…and several others. And we explored  
what this…this opportunity might be in the region and…and how the…a bank like the  
IDB could be involved in that process. Following that we came up with a…or first of  
all,  the  president  appointed  a  working  group,  it  was an  inter-disciplinary  working 
group made up from people from throughout the Bank, both in the public and the  
private sector. (…)In the end the decision was made to launch this initiative in a 2-
step process. The first would be to have a learning period where we would go out  
and we would try to understand what are the major players that are working in this  
area, especially private sector businesses in Latin America, but then also try to get  
an idea of what the market looks like. What is this group that we had identified? Let  
me go back for a minute and mention the study that we did with the World Resources 
Institute. As a result of that study, which is…it’s called “The Next Billion”…or “The 
Next Four Billion”. In that study they identified that within Latin America there’s a  
market of 350 million people or better…expressed, there is a group of people in Latin  
America, the “Majority” as we call them, which have annual earnings of less than 300 
dollars a month. And that comprises 70 % of the entire region. And we also became  
aware that this same group represents a purchasing power of 500 billion dollars. (…) 
So  we  went  out  and  we  did  these  studies,  we  did  segmentation  studies  of  the 
housing  market  in  Peru,  we  did…ah…basic  market  surveys  in  the 
telecommunications sector in Brazil and in Mexico. We also did market surveys in the  
health sector…in El Salvador and in Colombia. (…) We went back to our  Board of  
Directors  with  the  results  of  the  study,  they…they  agreed  that  there  was  an  
opportunity…they decided that we should take a private sector focus and so they 
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created the Opportunities for the Majority…ah…Facility, which is a 250 dollar lending 
facility  exclusively  for  Non-Sovereign-Guaranteed  Operations,  or  operations  with  
private sector businesses.(…)
E: How would you explain the strong support for OMJ by president Moreno? 
D: I think…ah…president Moreno came to the Bank with a reform agenda. He was  
looking for a way to…to shake up the institution and…and to revitalize it and make it  
relevant to today’s…ah…Latin America and the needs of the region. And…I…I think  
part  of  it  was the overall  institutional  realignment that…that  he led for  the Bank,  
which was a restructuring of the entire bank. Within that process, he created or…or  
under his leadership was created the Vice-Presidency for Private Sector, which had 
not existed before. There were three windows in the private sector in the Bank at that  
time: there was the Inter-American Investment Corporation, there’s the Multilateral  
Investment Fund, which are both…they both have their own charters…uhm…and 
governance structures even though they are part of the IDB Group. And then within  
the  Bank,  there  was  the  old  Private  Sector  which  became  the  Structured  and 
Corporate Finance Department. But of those three windows, none of them had an 
exclusive  focus  on  low-income  markets  and  on  solutions  for…on  market  based  
solutions for low income markets. (…) I think he just brought a personal, academic  
ah…and…and informed interest in this area (…). And by the way, this is the first  
Multilateral Development Bank that has a full-time…ah…team dedicated exclusively  
to  this  with  an  exclusive  focus  on  market-based  solutions  for  low-income  
communities. 
E: You already mentioned the MIF and the IIC. Since they’re both focusing on 
private  sector  operations  as well,  are  there  any…institutional  interests  with 
those members of the IDB Group (…)? Is there internal competition with those 
private sector arms of the IDB which may hinder the OMJ Office of the IDB? 
D: (…) I think initially (…) there was a lot of confusion about what the initiative was 
really  about  and…and  fears  that…of  competition  because  I  think  that  every  
department within the Bank is dedicated to working in Latin American Development  
and every department of the bank, almost every official in the Bank  would say that  
they are in some way engaged in this process of working not only with development  
but  of  also  helping  ah…ah…the  majority  in  Latin  America  or  the  low-income 
communities, either directly or indirectly through their work . (…) But I think when it  
finally became clear to people that first of all, we’re working only with Non-Sovereign-
Guaranteed Operations, that we’re trying to bring the private sector into the space,  
we’re looking for market-based initiatives, that this in no way substitutes for all the 
important work that has been done and must continue to be done with the public  
sector areas. (…) We’re really not competing with the MIF or the SCF or the IIC (…) I  
think the level of cooperation has been building…ahm…over the last year and a half  
with the other windows and as you know, we now have parallel financing on a lot of  
our operations (…)
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D: I mentioned earlier that we did these studies in the…in the health sector in a  
couple of countries. We’re finding the same thing there: that there’s a willingness by  
low-income  people  to  pay…ah…for  private  services  even  when  they  reportedly  
should be provided by the public sector. But because of a lack of resources and the  
quality of the services,if the private sector can come in with a better…better value 
proposition  then that  can  be  very  valuable  in  terms of  the  well-being  of…of  the  
families. 
E: So what are your future expectations for OMJ? What’s going to happen after 
2011? 
D: We hope that we have made…and believe we have a compelling case for what  
can be done…uhm…with…by bringing the private sector  into  developing these…
these…these ah, these market-based solutions for low-income communities. We see  
that that’s really resonating outside the Bank (…) and we also see the same thing  
happening inside the Bank. That gradually, as understanding builds of what we’re  
doing, the more comfortable people are with it and the more compelling the case is to  
try to…to keep moving forward and…and to build this…and…and make it an ongoing  
part of…of the Bank. (…) I think there’s going to be strong institutional support to  
move forward  with  this  and…and keep it  going.  (…)  My guess is  that  there will  
continue to be a dedicated tea…ah working on this, that that team will…ah…will…
will…will grow and…and this is gonna remain and become an increasingly important  
area of…of the many tools that the Bank has to…to serve our member countries in  
Latin America. 
E: Do you know of any other MDBs that are currently interested in forming 
institutions, departments similar to what OMJ is doing?
D: (…) IFC has been very interested in what we’re doing. In fact, they’re developing  
gradually a similar program of their own. I…I don’t know   they will necessarily have a 
separate institutional structure. It may be mainstreamed within their operations. (…)  
But I think it’s an important point here to add what Michael Chew has said, you know,  
one  of  our  strong  supporters  and…and  actually  one  of  our  clients,  professor  at  
Harvard University and former CEO of Accion International but…but he talks a lot  
about  the  need for  an  industry.  It’s  not  enough  to  just  have  individual  business  
models. (…) What would the ultimate vision of success be in what we’re trying to do?  
(…) That you’d find that markets in Latin America are working for low-income people,  
that there instead of being left out in informal processes where they’re paying these  
“poverty  penalties”  they’ve  been  brought  into  the  mainstream  markets  and  the  
markets are really working for them, both in terms of job creation and the provision 
of…of quality goods and services. But if you’re gonna make that happen, you can’t  
do it with a 250 million dollar facility and 25 operations in a team of 10 people even if  
you repeat that every year…or now we’re about 20 people really. So…it’s important  
that other players come into this space and…and it’s important to emphasize within 
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our dialogue what we’ve tried to do there. We’ve created this new website as well,  
you know, Majority Markets. The idea is that this is not just an IDB space. We wanted  
to move it off our own website to show that this is a…a…an honest open dialogue of  
everyone who wants to help in this (…) So if…if IFC wants to come into this and if  
the…you  know  the  CAF  and  the…the  a  Central  American  Bank  for  Economic 
Integration and the AfDB and the ADB…you know, if all those players wanna come  
into this space, that would be fabulous and I would only hope that we have a small  
role in inspiring them to do so. 
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Annex 3: OMJ Development Effectiveness Matrix (DEM)
Source: IADB 2008 
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OMJ Development Effectiveness Matrix (“DEM”)
Development Outcomes 
5  Rating  categories:  Excellent,  Good,  Satisfactory,  Partly 
Unsatisfactory, Unsatisfactory
Indicator
Expected Results
Indicator
Rating
Performance 
Area Rating
Project or Company Business Performance  Area rating
(1) FRR/ROIC Number Rating
(1-1)Sector specific indicator – Revenue growth Number Rating
(1-2) Sector specific  indicator – New clients Number Rating
(1-3)  Sector specific  indicator – Other Number Rating
Contribution to Economic Development Area rating
(2) ERR/EROIC Number Rating
(2-1) Sector specific indicator (e.g., # people with new services) Number Rating
(2-2) Sector specific indicator (e.g., improved living standards) Number Rating
(2-3) Sector specific indicator - Other Number Rating
Environmental & Social Effects  Area rating
(3) IDB Policy Compliance Rating
Private Sector Development  Area rating
(4) Competition Rating
(5) Market Expansion Rating
(6) Private Ownership & Entrepreneurship Rating
(7)Technology & Know-How Transfer Rating
(8) Higher Standards of Corporate Governance Rating
(9) Changes in Legal Regulatory Framework Rating
(10) Impact on physical or financial market infrastructure Rating
IDB Strategic Development Objectives  Area rating
(11) Country Diversification -C& D Country Rating
(12) Relevance to Country/Regional and/or Sector Strategy Rating
(13) Targeting of Majority Populations Rating
(14) Role of Majority in Project Company Rating
(15) Demonstration Effect /Potential for Replication Rating
(16)  Potential for Scale Rating
(17) Alliances with stakeholders Rating
IDB’s Role – Additionality  
Financial Additionality Area rating
(18)  Provision  of  amounts,  tenors  and/or  key  terms  & 
conditions not available in marketplace
 Rating
(19) Resource mobilization  Rating
Non-Financial Additionality Area rating
(20) Improvement in project structure/ risk allocation through 
financial engineering or  innovative financial instruments. 
 Rating
(21) Improvement in the context of the project (e.g. regulatory 
environment) through use of  TC or other intervention.
 Rating
(22) Improvement of Corporate Governance  Rating
(23) Improvement of Environmental/Social standards  Rating
Comprehensive  Rating Overall rating
Annex 4: Organizational Chart of the IADB       Source: IADB 2010, www
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ABSTRACT
The present thesis deals with a critical assessment of the „Bottom of the Pyramid 
(BoP)” Model for Poverty Reduction and its implementation by the “Opportunities for 
the Majority (OMJ)”-Initiative of the Inter-American Development Bank.
Despite  many  years  of  efforts  and  development  interventions  global  poverty  still 
prevails. Traditional aid-based strategies, mostly driven by the public sector, have not 
produced  the  desired  results  and  chances  of  meeting  the  first  Millennium 
Development Goal of halving global poverty by the year 2015 are small. Given this 
reality,  some  academics  have  turned  toward  the  private  sector  as  an  actor  in 
development.  Its  capacity  to  innovate  and  efficiently  use  resources,  increasing 
importance  in  our  globalized  society  and  its  financial  means  seem to  make  it  a 
promising player in the fight against poverty.  Indeed, corporations have engaged in 
poverty reduction for several reasons and in different ways, such as policy dialogue, 
Corporate  Social  Responsibility  programs or  social  business  models.  Out  of  this 
rationale,  C.K.  Prahalad  and  Stuart  Hart  developed  the  Bottom-of-the-Pyramid 
approach, which intends to achieve the alleviation of poverty by directing profitable 
business activities at low-income populations and incorporating them into the formal 
economy. The pyramid is used as a metaphor for the income distribution in society, 
with  the  top  representing  the  wealthy  minority  and  the  bottom  representing  the 
population with low incomes. The analysis of this approach, including its origins and 
points of critique, is at the core of this thesis. Despite much criticism for dubious 
assumptions and the potential risk of exploiting the poor, Prahalad’s theory enjoys 
high acceptance among international development institutions. The Inter-American 
Development  Bank  has  demonstrated  particular  interest  and  founded  the 
“Opportunities for the Majority”-Initiative in 2006, which is dedicated exclusively to the 
support  of  BoP business solutions in Latin America.  A critical  assessment of  the 
activities of OMJ constitutes the second, empirical part of this thesis. The feasibility 
and impact of  the BoP approach are evaluated by applying the points of  critique 
raised at the theory to two selected OMJ project examples.
Although  some  criticism  seems  warranted,  the  popularity  of  the  BoP  theory  is 
increasing  among  international  public  and  private  organizations  alike.  Hence, 
prospects for the OMJ-Office are highly positive.
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG
Das  Erkenntnisinteresse  dieser  Diplomarbeit  liegt  in  einer  kritischen  Analyse  der 
„Bottom-of-the-Pyramid (BoP)“-Theorie zur Armutsbekämpfung und ihrer Umsetzung 
durch  die  „Opportunities  for  the  Majority“-Initiative  der  Interamerikanischen 
Entwicklungsbank. 
Nach  einem  einleitenden  Überblick  über  verschiedene  Definitionen  von  Armut 
werden  traditionelle  Strategien  zur  Armutsbekämpfung,  die  in  erster  Linie  auf 
Spendengeldern  basieren,  skizziert  und  der  Beitrag  privater  Unternehmen  zur 
globalen Armutsbekämpfung analysiert. Die Motive für Unternehmen, sich in diesem 
Bereich zu engagieren werden ebenso untersucht, wie die Möglichkeiten konkreter 
Beteiligung. Neben Public-Private-Partnerships und Social Entrepreneurships bietet 
das  „Bottom-of-the-Pyramid“-Modell  eine  Möglichkeit,  Armutsbekämpfung  als 
integralen Teil  in die Geschäftsidee eines Unternehmens einzubinden. Ziel  dieses 
Modells, welches von C.K. Prahalad und Stuart Hart entwickelt wurde, ist es, niedrige 
sozio-ökonomische Schichten in den formellen Wirtschaftssektor zu integrieren und 
so zur globalen Armutsbekämpfung beizutragen. Die Pyramide dient als Metapher für 
die Einkommensverteilung in der Bevölkerung. Während an der Spitze eine kleine 
Minderheit von Reichen steht, bildet die Bevölkerung mit niedrigem Einkommen die 
Basis  der  Pyramide.  Die  Analyse  der  BoP-Theorie,  welche  in  gleichem  Masse 
Vorteile  für  Firmen  und  Arme  verspricht,  stellt,  unter  Berücksichtigung  ihrer 
Entstehung und Kritik, den Kern der Diplomarbeit dar. 
Die Interamerikanische Entwicklungsbank zählt zu den wichtigsten Anhängern dieser 
Theorie. Im Jahr 2006 etablierte sie mit der „Opportunities for the Majority (OMJ)“-
Initiative  eine  eigene institutionelle  Einheit  zur  Entwicklung und Finanzierung von 
BoP-Geschäftsmodellen  in  Lateinamerika.  Die  Analyse  dieser  Abteilung  mit  ihrer 
Entstehungsgeschichte und Positionierung innerhalb der Organisation ist Inhalt des 
zweiten, empirischen Teils der Diplomarbeit. Anhand zweier konkreter Fallbeispiele 
werden die Aktivitäten der IADB im BoP-Bereich aufgezeigt und anschließend auf die 
Kritikpunkte des Theorieteils untersucht. Fazit  ist,  dass sich die BoP-Theorie trotz 
teils  gerechtfertigter  Kritik  international  sowohl  im  öffentlichen  als  auch  privaten 
Sektor  zunehmender  Beliebtheit  erfreut.  Entsprechend  positiv  sind   die 
Zukunftsaussichten für „Opportunities for the Majority“. 
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